People have a tendency to disregard information that contradicts their partisan or ideological identity. This inclination can become especially striking when citizens reject notions that scientists would consider “facts” in the light of overwhelming scientific evidence and consensus. The resulting polarization over science has reached alarming levels in recent years. This theoretical review conceptualizes political polarization over science and argues that it is driven by two interrelated processes. Through psychological science rejection, people can implicitly disregard scientific facts that are inconsistent with their political identity. Alternatively, citizens can engage in ideological science rejection by adhering to a political ideology that explicitly contests science. This contestation can in turn be subdivided into four levels of generalization: An ideology can dispute either specific scientific claims, distinct research fields, science in general, or the entire political system and elite. By proposing this interdisciplinary framework, this article aims to integrate insights from various disciplines.

This three-wave cohort-sequential longitudinal study (N = 1302) examined the development of two core political attitudes, economic egalitarianism and ethnocentrism, among Dutch youths between age 12 and 31. Longitudinal regression analyses revealed a curvilinear mean level development for both attitudes, reflecting an increased disagreement with economic redistribution and multiculturalism around late adolescence. Furthermore, attitudes became decreasingly polarized (i.e., less extreme) and increasingly stable with age. Finally, several effects of attitudes' correlates gradually changed: The effect of educational level on ethnocentrism increased with age, whereas the effect of gender diminished. Regional effects on ethnocentrism developed as youths resided in a new area. No age-related change was found in the effect of parental SES. Overall, these findings support the idea that attitudes mature during the formative phase of adolescence and that this process slows down during emerging adulthood. Furthermore, these results support developmental explanations for the association between attitudes and their correlates.

A family’s SES can be changeable over time. This study was the first to investigate if such within-individual changes in family SES are associated with parallel fluctuations in boys’ delinquent behavior from childhood to adolescence. Participants were a community sample of boys and their caregivers (N = 503) who were assessed annually for ten consecutive years spanning ages 7–18. Fixed effects models revealed that changes in familial SES were related to changes in delinquency: Youths were more likely to offend during years in which their parents’ SES was lower than during years in which their parents’ SES was higher. Contrary to expectations, we found no evidence that this association was accounted for by families moving to different neighborhoods or by changes in parenting. Since within-individual models provide a stricter test of causality than between-individual models, these findings support claims that impacting familial SES may have a direct effect on youths’ delinquency.

This six-wave multi-informant longitudinal study on Dutch adolescents (N = 824; age 12-18) examined the interplay of socioeconomic status with parental monitoring in predicting minor delinquency. Fixed-effects negative binomial regression analyses revealed that this interplay is different within adolescents across time than between adolescents. Between individuals, parental solicitation and control were not significantly associated with delinquency after controlling for SES: Adolescents whose parents exercised more monitoring did not offend less than others. Within individuals, higher levels of parental control were unexpectedly associated with more delinquency, but this relation was dependent on SES: Low-SES adolescents, but not high-SES adolescents, offended more during periods in which their parents exercised more control than during other periods with less control. In contrast to earlier work, this finding suggests that monitoring could be least effective when needed most. Low-SES parents might not use monitoring effectively and become overcontrolling when their child goes astray.

This cohort-sequential longitudinal study among 1302 Dutch youths examined the dynamics of political identity (e.g., Democrat or Rightist) and issue attitudes between age 12 and 30. Some theories propose that voters form an identity early in life that subsequently determines attitudes. Other theories contrarily argue that attitudes are a cause of identity. However, research on this controversy has never focused on the crucial phase of adolescence. Results revealed that youths formed an identity consistent with prior attitudes more than vice versa. Highly educated youths most often adjusted their attitudes to their identity, which explained an emerging education gap in identity-attitude consistency. Finally, findings suggested that early cultural attitudes establish an identity that may subsequently determine economic attitudes.

No abstract

This cohort-sequential panel study on Dutch youths (N = 3394) and their parents examined the formation of party preference between age 12 and 25. Specifically, it aimed to pinpoint the most formative component and age in a multiparty context. Opinionation, stability and correlates were examined for three components of party preference: party identification, voting intention and left-right identification. Results revealed that most youths formed a preference at some point during their early life. The 6-year stability of party preference was already substantial during early adolescence and increased until early adulthood. Party preference became increasingly related to youths' social characteristics and issue attitudes with age, but parents remained important. Whereas studies from two-party systems emphasized the importance of party identification, this study suggested that left-right identification may instead predominate the early formation, intergenerational transmission and life-course stability of party preference in the Netherlands. The most formative period was around age 18.

A central question in Western European electoral research is whether electoral changes over the past decades should be interpreted in terms of dealignment or realignment. Although many scholars study this question, they have not paid much attention to the role of generational replacement. This 'age-period-cohort' (APC) study fills this void by examining the last 10 national elections in the Netherlands (1986-2017). The hypothesis is tested that the determinants of party choice differ systematically across generations. With regard to period effects, it is found that the association between party preference and its predictors has mainly weakened. Over generations, contrarily no decreasing associations are found. The effects of religion, social class, partisanship, left-right and redistribution have not structurally decreased with each successive generation, whereas the effects of education, immigration and European unification are stronger for younger generations. Taken together, these findings reveal how dealignment over time can co-exist with realignment over generations.