SummaryBackgroundSeveral countries are considering a minimum price policy for alcohol, but concerns exist about the potential effects on drinkers with low incomes. We aimed to assess the effect of a £0·45 minimum unit price (1 unit is 8 g/10 mL ethanol) in England across the income and socioeconomic distributions.MethodsWe used the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) version 2.6, a causal, deterministic, epidemiological model, to assess effects of a minimum unit price policy. SAPM accounts for alcohol purchasing and consumption preferences for population subgroups including income and socioeconomic groups. Purchasing preferences are regarded as the types and volumes of alcohol beverages, prices paid, and the balance between on-trade (eg, bars) and off-trade (eg, shops). We estimated price elasticities from 9 years of survey data and did sensitivity analyses with alternative elasticities. We assessed effects of the policy on moderate, hazardous, and harmful drinkers, split into three socioeconomic groups (living in routine or manual households, intermediate households, and managerial or professional households). We examined policy effects on alcohol consumption, spending, rates of alcohol-related health harm, and opportunity costs associated with that harm. Rates of harm and costs were estimated for a 10 year period after policy implementation. We adjusted baseline rates of mortality and morbidity to account for differential risk between socioeconomic groups.FindingsOverall, a minimum unit price of £0·45 led to an immediate reduction in consumption of 1·6% (−11·7 units per drinker per year) in our model. Moderate drinkers were least affected in terms of consumption (−3·8 units per drinker per year for the lowest income quintile vs 0·8 units increase for the highest income quintile) and spending (increase in spending of £0·04 vs £1·86 per year). The greatest behavioural changes occurred in harmful drinkers (change in consumption of −3·7% or −138·2 units per drinker per year, with a decrease in spending of £4·01), especially in the lowest income quintile (−7·6% or −299·8 units per drinker per year, with a decrease in spending of £34·63) compared with the highest income quintile (−1·0% or −34·3 units, with an increase in spending of £16·35). Estimated health benefits from the policy were also unequally distributed. Individuals in the lowest socioeconomic group (living in routine or manual worker households and comprising 41·7% of the sample population) would accrue 81·8% of reductions in premature deaths and 87·1% of gains in terms of quality-adjusted life-years.InterpretationIrrespective of income, moderate drinkers were little affected by a minimum unit price of £0·45 in our model, with the greatest effects noted for harmful drinkers. Because harmful drinkers on low incomes purchase more alcohol at less than the minimum unit price threshold compared with other groups, they would be affected most by this policy. Large reductions in consumption in this group would however coincide with substantial health gains in t...

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Context and aims Internationally, the repertoire of alcohol pricing policies has expanded to include targeted taxation, inflation-linked taxation, taxation based on alcohol-by-volume (ABV), minimum pricing policies (general or targeted), bans of below-cost selling and restricting price-based promotions. Policy makers clearly need to consider how options compare in reducing harms at the population level, but are also required to demonstrate proportionality of their actions, which necessitates a detailed understanding of policy effects on different population subgroups. This paper presents selected findings from a policy appraisal for the UK government and discusses the importance of accounting for population heterogeneity in such analyses. Method We have built a causal, deterministic, epidemiological model which takes account of differential preferences by population subgroups defined by age, gender and level of drinking (moderate, hazardous, harmful). We consider purchasing preferences in terms of the types and volumes of alcoholic beverages, prices paid and the balance between bars, clubs and restaurants as opposed to supermarkets and off-licenses. Results Age, sex and level of drinking fundamentally affect beverage preferences, drinking location, prices paid, price sensitivity and tendency to substitute for other beverage types. Pricing policies vary in their impact on different product types, price points and venues, thus having distinctly different effects on subgroups. Because population subgroups also have substantially different risk profiles for harms, policies are differentially effective in reducing health, crime, work-place absence and unemployment harms. Conclusion Policy appraisals must account for population heterogeneity and complexity if resulting interventions are to be well considered, proportionate, effective and cost-effective.

-This inquiry explores the effectiveness of a class of modern evolutionary algorithms, represented by NSGA-11, for solving optimisation tasks with many conflicting objectives. Optimiser behaviour is assessed for a grid of recombination operator configurations. Performance maps are obtained for the dual aims of proximity to, and distribution across, the optimal trade-off surface. Classical settings for recombination are shown to be suitable for small numbers of objectives but correspond to very poor performance as the number of objectives is increased, even when large population sizes are used. Explanations for this behaviour are offered via the concepts of dominance resistance and active diversity promotion.