In A General Theory of Crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi propose that low self-control, in interaction with criminal opportunity, is the major cause of crime. The research reported in this article attempts to test this argument while closely following the nominal definitions presented by Gottfredson and Hirschi. A factor analysis of items designed to measure low self-control is consistent with their contention that the trait is unidimensional. Further, the proposed interaction effect is found for self-reported acts of both fraud and force (their definition of crime). Inconsistent with the theory are (a) the finding that criminal opportunity has a significant main effect, beyond its interaction with low self-control, on self-reported crime and (b) the substantial proportion of variance in crime left unexplained by the theoretical variables. Suggestions are offered for modifying and expanding the theory.

After a period of decline in the discipline, the social disorganization model of Shaw and McKay is again beginning to appear in the literature. This paper examines five criticisms of the perspective and discusses recent attempts to address those issues and problems that are still in need of resolution.

We propose that significant others and conscience function as agents of social control in a manner similar to the State. All three pose possible threats or costs that are more or less certain and severe which actors take into account in considering whether or not to violate the law. State-imposed costs, which have been addressed in the literature on deterrence, are material deprivations in the form of fines and incarceration. Socially imposed costs are the embarrassment or loss of respect actors might experience when they violate norms which significant others support. Self-imposed costs are shame or guilt feelings which actors might impose upon themselves when they offend their own conscience by engaging in behaviors they consider morally wrong. The threats of shame and embarrassment, like the threat of legal sanctions, affect the expected utility of crime and, thus, the likelihood that crime will occur. In the research reported here, parallel measures are developed of the perceived threats of each of these three kinds of punishment for three illegal behaviors (tax cheating, petty theft, drunk driving). The effects of these perceived threats on people's intentions to violate the law are then examined in a random sample of adults. Threats of shame and of legal sanctions inhibit the inclination to commit each of the three offenses, but the findings for embarrassment appear less compatible with the expected utility model.

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