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Local officials and national observers have attributed the New York City drop in violent crime during the 1990s to the aggressive enforcement of public order, but relevant research is limited and yields contrasting conclusions regarding the effects of order‐maintenance policing (OMP) on violent crime trends in New York City. The current study investigates the effects of order‐maintenance arrests on precinct‐level robbery and homicide trends in New York City with more reliable crime and arrest data, longer time series, and more extensive controls for other influences than used in prior research. We find statistically significant but small crime‐reduction effects of OMP and conclude that the impact of aggressive order enforcement on the reduction in homicide and robbery rates in New York City during the 1990s was modest at best.

Research Summary: Police officials across the United States often claimed credit for crime reductions during the 1990s. In this article, we examine homicide trends in three cities that mounted widely publicized policing interventions during the 1990s: Boston's Operation Ceasefire, New York's Compstat, and Richmond, Virginia's Project Exile. Applying growth‐curve analysis to data from the 95 largest U.S. cities and controlling for conditions known to be associated with violent crime rates, we find that New York's homicide trend during the 1990s did not differ significantly from those of other large cities. We find some indication of a sharper homicide drop in Boston than elsewhere, but the small number of incidents precludes strong conclusions. By contrast, Richmond's homicide reduction was significantly greater than the decline in other large cities after the implementation of Project Exile, which is consistent with claims of an intervention effect, although the effect may have been small. Policy Implications: Criminologists gave police and other public officials something of a free ride as they claimed credit for the 1990s crime drop. We propose that researchers employ comparable data and methods to evaluate such claims‐making, with the current analysis intended as a departure point for ongoing research. The use of common evaluation criteria is especially urgent for assessing the effects of the multiple interventions to reduce violent crime launched under the nation's primary domestic crime‐control initiative, Project Safe Neighborhoods.

Despite its long history in criminology, research on the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and rates of common crime remains limited. That is in part because many analysts doubt that any systematic relationship exists and in part because of disagreement with regard to the validity of the indicators typically used to measure economic conditions. We argue in this article that good theoretical reasons exist to expect macroeconomic effects on crime rates, but many theories imply that collective perceptions of economic hardship should have effects on crime that are independent of those of more "objective" economic indicators. To evaluate this argument, we examine the relationships between the Index of Consumer Sentiment and regional robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft rates in the United States between 1970 and 2003, which was a period of large swings in both consumer sentiment and instrumental crime. Controlling for several factors thought to influence temporal variation in crime rates, we find that consumer sentiment had significant effects on robbery and property crime rates over the period that were largely independent of the * A previous version of the paper was presented at the 2006 meeting of the American Sociological Association. We thank the anonymous reviewers, the editor, and Eric Baumer for helpful comments on a previous draft.

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