Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. A key figure which can be applied to measuring inter-generational imbalances involved in existing public pension schemes is given by the "implicit tax" that is levied on each generation's life-time income through participation in these systems. The implicit tax arises from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits received fall short of actuarial returns to contributions (i.e., "explicit" social security taxes) paid while actively working. If, in spite of large-scale demographic ageing, public pension schemes are continued to be run based on current rules, implicit tax rates will sharply increase for generations who are currently young when compared to those who are already approaching retirement. In the paper, this will be illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The results are based on simulations covering representative individuals in all age cohorts born from 1940 to 2000. At the same time, there are striking differences across countries regarding both the level of implicit taxes and their time paths over successive age cohorts, which can be attributed to different ageing processes as well as to different institutional features of national pension systems. In addition, we are studying the impact of pension reforms that were recently enacted or are currently under way, thus demonstrating how effective the measures taken are in terms of smoothing the inter-generational profile of implicit tax rates. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification: H55, J11, D63.
: This article analyses the impact of EU structural policy on the economic development of German regions between 1995 and 2004. In this period East‐German regions have converged, while regional disparities have been increasing in West‐Germany. In addition East‐German Landkreise have caught up with poor western regions. However the overall gap between rich and poor Landkreise has risen. Economic theory describes a trade‐off between regional convergence and aggregate growth. Our empirical findings support this hypothesis. It is shown that the EU's regional transfers speed up convergence, but have a negative impact on long‐run aggregate growth.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper analyzes how integrated labor markets affect the financing of higher education. For this, we employ a general-equilibrium model with overlapping generations and individuals who differ in their abilities. At the first stage, governments can choose the quality of education and the financing system. At the second stage, individuals make their education and migration decisions given the governmental framework for higher education and the mobility assumptions. Terms of use: Documents inIn a closed economy and in the presence of imperfect credit markets, a mix of tax-and feefinancing is optimal. In integrated labor markets, countries have an incentive to attract skilled workers and to free-ride on education provided by other countries. When only skilled workers are mobile, there is a sub-optimal shift from taxes to fees and the number of students is too low. When also students can migrate, there is a countervailing force such that maintaining the optimal financial mix becomes possible.JEL-Code: I200, H700.
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