We analyze the effects of socio-economic and institutional determinants, especially labor-market institutions and features of social protection systems, on migrants' location choices. Based on micro-data for France, Germany, the UK, and the USA, we study migration to one of these four countries using a multinomial choice framework. Our estimates confirm conventional results regarding wages, networks, and unemployment rates. In addition, we find that there are indications of "insider-outsider effects" for union coverage and unemployment benefits, while employment protection does not have a clear-cut impact on migration. Good education and health systems tend to attract migrants, while generous pension systems deter them.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. A key figure which can be applied to measuring inter-generational imbalances involved in existing public pension schemes is given by the "implicit tax" that is levied on each generation's life-time income through participation in these systems. The implicit tax arises from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits received fall short of actuarial returns to contributions (i.e., "explicit" social security taxes) paid while actively working. If, in spite of large-scale demographic ageing, public pension schemes are continued to be run based on current rules, implicit tax rates will sharply increase for generations who are currently young when compared to those who are already approaching retirement. In the paper, this will be illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The results are based on simulations covering representative individuals in all age cohorts born from 1940 to 2000. At the same time, there are striking differences across countries regarding both the level of implicit taxes and their time paths over successive age cohorts, which can be attributed to different ageing processes as well as to different institutional features of national pension systems. In addition, we are studying the impact of pension reforms that were recently enacted or are currently under way, thus demonstrating how effective the measures taken are in terms of smoothing the inter-generational profile of implicit tax rates. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification: H55, J11, D63.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Over the next four decades, increasing old-age dependency ratios exert an enormous upward pressure on welfare spending in most developed countries. As this is mainly due to existing unfunded public pension schemes, many countries have embarked on far-reaching reforms in this area, strengthening actuarial fairness, modifying indexation rules, adding elements of prefunding and, last but not least, attempting to extend the period of economic activity. Efforts to contain costs may also be relevant with regard to public expenditure on health and long-term care but, thus far, no country has started to really deal with these issues. Still, some countries have made substantial progress in securing the long-term sustainability of their welfare systems. What remains to be considered is re-constructing the system of intergenerational transactions as a potential way of removing disincentives to raise children and invest in their human capital in the long run. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: H50, H68, J11.

We consider lifetime health insurance contracts in which ageing provisions are used to smooth the premium profile. The capital stock accumulated for each individual can be decomposed into two parts: a premium insurance and an annuitised life insurance, only the latter being transferable between insurers without triggering premium changes through risk segmentation. In a simulation based on German data, the transferable share declines in age and falls with an increasing age of entry into the contract. In spite of different benefit profiles, it is almost identical for women and men.JEL Code: D91, G22, I18.

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An analysis of the effect of public pension schemes on a country's fertility rate and a proposal for policies to reform pension coverage in light of this. The rapidly aging populations of many developed countries—most notably Japan and member countries of the European Union—present obvious problems for the public pension plans of these countries. Not only will there be disproportionately fewer workers making pension contributions than there are retirees drawing pension benefits, but the youth-to-age imbalance would significantly affect the total contributive capacity of future generations and hence their total income growth. In Children and Pensions, Alessandro Cigno and Martin Werding examine the way pension policy and child-related benefits affect fertility behavior and productivity growth. They present theoretical arguments to the effect that public pension coverage as such will reduce aggregate fertility and may raise aggregate household savings. They argue further that public pensions, as they are currently designed, discourage parents from private human capital investment in their children to improve the children's future earning capacity. After an overview of pension and child benefit policies (focusing on the European Union, Japan, and the United States), the authors offer an empirical and theoretical analysis and a simulation of the effects of the policies under discussion. Their policy proposals to address declines in fertility and productivity growth include the innovative suggestion that relates a person's pension entitlements to his or her number of children and the children's earning ability—proposing that, in effect, a person's pension could be financed in part or in full by the pensioner's own children.