Seven provider organizations in Massachusetts entered the Blue Cross Blue Shield Alternative Quality Contract in 2009, followed by four more organizations in 2010. This contract, based on a global budget and pay-for-performance for achieving certain quality benchmarks, places providers at risk for excessive spending and rewards them for quality, similar to the new Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations in Medicare. We analyzed changes in spending and quality associated with the Alternative Quality Contract and found that the rate of increase in spending slowed compared to control groups. Overall, participation in the contract over two years led to a savings of 3.3% (1.9% in year-1, 3.3% in year-2) compared to spending in groups not participating in the contract. The savings were even higher for groups whose previous experience had been only in fee-for-service contracting. Such groups’ quarterly savings over two years averaged 8.2% (6.3% in year-1, 9.9% in year-2). Quality of care also improved within organizations participating in the Alternative Quality Contract compared to control organizations in both years. Chronic care management, adult preventive care, and pediatric care improved from year 1 to year 2 within the contracting groups. These results suggest that global budgets coupled with pay-for-performance can begin to slow the underlying growth in medical spending while improving quality.

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Background In 2009, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS) implemented a global payment system called the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC). Provider groups in the AQC system assume accountability for spending, similar to accountable care organizations that bear financial risk. Moreover, groups are eligible to receive bonuses for quality. Methods Seven provider organizations began 5-year contracts as part of the AQC system in 2009. We analyzed 2006–2009 claims for 380,142 enrollees whose primary care physicians (PCPs) were in the AQC system (intervention group) and for 1,351,446 enrollees whose PCPs were not in the system (control group). We used a propensity-weighted difference-in-differences approach, adjusting for age, sex, health status, and secular trends to isolate the treatment effect of the AQC in comparisons of spending and quality between the intervention group and the control group. Results Average spending increased for enrollees in both the intervention and control groups in 2009, but the increase was smaller for enrollees in the intervention group — $15.51 (1.9%) less per quarter (P = 0.007). Savings derived largely from shifts in outpatient care toward facilities with lower fees; from lower expenditures for procedures, imaging, and testing; and from a reduction in spending for enrollees with the highest expected spending. The AQC system was associated with an improvement in performance on measures of the quality of the management of chronic conditions in adults (P<0.001) and of pediatric care (P = 0.001), but not of adult preventive care. All AQC groups met 2009 budget targets and earned surpluses. Total BCBS payments to AQC groups, including bonuses for quality, are likely to have exceeded the estimated savings in year 1. Conclusions The AQC system was associated with a modest slowing of spending growth and improved quality of care in 2009. Savings were achieved through changes in referral patterns rather than through changes in utilization. The long-term effect of the AQC system on spending growth depends on future budget targets and providers’ ability to further improve efficiencies in practice. (Funded by the Commonwealth Fund and others.)

New strategies to control U.S. health spending growth are urgently needed. Although provider payment cuts are likely, cutting fee-for-service (FFS) payments will hurt quality and access. A more sensible approach would be to restructure the delivery system into organized networks of providers delivering reliable, evidence-based care. But restructuring will not occur without payment policy reform. Four policy options are commonly cited: recalibrating FFS, instituting pay-for-performance, creating episode-based payments, and adopting global payments. We argue that episode payments are the most immediately viable approach, and we recommend that payment reforms precede any payment reductions so that new delivery models can gain traction. [Health Affairs 28, no. 2 (2009) T h e r e i s s t r o n g c o n s e n s us t h at t h e U.S. health care system fails to provide either the quality or the value that it should, and that substantial restructuring is urgently needed. 1 Despite deep dysfunction and numerous public and private reform efforts, the system has been astoundingly resistant to change. 2 But health spending has reached a level where continued annual increases two to three percentage points faster than the nation's economic growth will increasingly limit the ability of employers and public programs to offer health coverage. Unless the forty-year historical spending trend miraculously abates, vigorous expansion of public and private cost control initiatives is inevitable.Of the strategies capable of immediately slowing growth in health spending, reducing benefits and limiting services run counter to the urgent need to improve health care access. This leaves provider payment cuts as the "least bad" option for achieving short-term savings. However, in the fragmented U.S. delivery system, cutting fee-for-service (FFS) payments over any sustained time period will hurt w 2 6 2 2 7 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 9 C o m m e n t a r y

In January 2009 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts launched a new payment arrangement called the Alternative Quality Contract. The contract stipulates a modified global payment (fixed payments for the care of a patient during a specified time period) arrangement. The model differs from past models of fixed payments or capitation because it explicitly connects payments to achieving quality goals and defines the rate of increase for each contract group's budget over a five-year period, unlike typical annual contracts. All groups participating in the Alternative Quality Contract earned significant quality bonuses in the first year. This arrangement exemplifies the type of experimentation encouraged by the Affordable Care Act. We describe this unique contract and show how it surmounts hurdles previously encountered with other global-payment models.

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