Amid soaring health spending, there is growing interest in workplace disease prevention and wellness programs to improve health and lower costs. In a critical meta-analysis of the literature on costs and savings associated with such programs, we found that medical costs fall by about $3.27 for every dollar spent on wellness programs and that absenteeism costs fall by about $2.73 for every dollar spent. Although further exploration of the mechanisms at work and broader applicability of the findings is needed, this return on investment suggests that the wider adoption of such programs could prove beneficial for budgets and productivity as well as health outcomes.

Difference-in-difference (DD) methods are a common strategy for evaluating the effects of policies or programs that are instituted at a particular point in time, such as the implementation of a new law. The DD method compares changes over time in a group unaffected by the policy intervention to the changes over time in a group affected by the policy intervention, and attributes the “difference-in-differences” to the effect of the policy. DD methods provide unbiased effect estimates if the trend over time would have been the same between the intervention and comparison groups in the absence of the intervention. However, a concern with DD models is that the program and intervention groups may differ in ways that would affect their trends over time, or their compositions may change over time. Propensity score methods are commonly used to handle this type of confounding in other non-experimental studies, but the particular considerations when using them in the context of a DD model have not been well investigated. In this paper, we describe the use of propensity scores in conjunction with DD models, in particular investigating a propensity score weighting strategy that weights the four groups (defined by time and intervention status) to be balanced on a set of characteristics. We discuss the conceptual issues associated with this approach, including the need for caution when selecting variables to include in the propensity score model, particularly given the multiple time point nature of the analysis. We illustrate the ideas and method with an application estimating the effects of a new payment and delivery system innovation (an accountable care organization model called the “Alternative Quality Contract” (AQC) implemented by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts) on health plan enrollee out-of-pocket mental health service expenditures. We find no evidence that the AQC affected out-of-pocket mental health service expenditures of enrollees.

Seven provider organizations in Massachusetts entered the Blue Cross Blue Shield Alternative Quality Contract in 2009, followed by four more organizations in 2010. This contract, based on a global budget and pay-for-performance for achieving certain quality benchmarks, places providers at risk for excessive spending and rewards them for quality, similar to the new Pioneer Accountable Care Organizations in Medicare. We analyzed changes in spending and quality associated with the Alternative Quality Contract and found that the rate of increase in spending slowed compared to control groups. Overall, participation in the contract over two years led to a savings of 3.3% (1.9% in year-1, 3.3% in year-2) compared to spending in groups not participating in the contract. The savings were even higher for groups whose previous experience had been only in fee-for-service contracting. Such groups’ quarterly savings over two years averaged 8.2% (6.3% in year-1, 9.9% in year-2). Quality of care also improved within organizations participating in the Alternative Quality Contract compared to control organizations in both years. Chronic care management, adult preventive care, and pediatric care improved from year 1 to year 2 within the contracting groups. These results suggest that global budgets coupled with pay-for-performance can begin to slow the underlying growth in medical spending while improving quality.

IMPORTANCE Employers have increasingly invested in workplace wellness programs to improve employee health and decrease health care costs. However, there is little experimental evidence on the effects of these programs. OBJECTIVE To evaluate a multicomponent workplace wellness program resembling programs offered by US employers.

Context Physician referrals play a central role in ambulatory care in the US, yet little is known about national trends in physician referrals over time. Objective To assess changes in the rate of referrals to other physicians from physician office visits in the US, 1999 to 2009. Design, Setting and Participants We analyzed nationally representative cross-sections of ambulatory patient visits in the US using a sample of 845,243 visits from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys 1993–2009, focusing on the decade from 1999 to 2009. Main Outcome Measures Survey-weighted estimates of the total number and percentage of visits resulting in a referral to another physician across several patient and physician characteristics. Results From 1999 to 2009, the probability that an ambulatory visit to a physician resulted in a referral to another physician increased from 4.83% to 9.29% (p<0.001), a 92% increase. The absolute number of visits resulting in a physician referral increased 159% nationally over this time, from 40.6 million to 105 million. This trend was consistent across all subgroups examined, except for slower growth among physicians with ownership stakes in their practice (p=0.016) or with the majority of income from managed care contracts (p=0.007). Changes in referral rates varied according to the principal symptoms accounting for patients’ visits, with significant increases noted for visits to PCPs with cardiovascular, gastrointestinal, and ear/nose/throat complaints. Conclusion The percentage and absolute number of ambulatory visits resulting in a referral in the US grew substantially from 1999 to 2009. More research is necessary to understand the contribution of rising referral rates to costs of care.

Background In 2009, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBS) implemented a global payment system called the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC). Provider groups in the AQC system assume accountability for spending, similar to accountable care organizations that bear financial risk. Moreover, groups are eligible to receive bonuses for quality. Methods Seven provider organizations began 5-year contracts as part of the AQC system in 2009. We analyzed 2006–2009 claims for 380,142 enrollees whose primary care physicians (PCPs) were in the AQC system (intervention group) and for 1,351,446 enrollees whose PCPs were not in the system (control group). We used a propensity-weighted difference-in-differences approach, adjusting for age, sex, health status, and secular trends to isolate the treatment effect of the AQC in comparisons of spending and quality between the intervention group and the control group. Results Average spending increased for enrollees in both the intervention and control groups in 2009, but the increase was smaller for enrollees in the intervention group — $15.51 (1.9%) less per quarter (P = 0.007). Savings derived largely from shifts in outpatient care toward facilities with lower fees; from lower expenditures for procedures, imaging, and testing; and from a reduction in spending for enrollees with the highest expected spending. The AQC system was associated with an improvement in performance on measures of the quality of the management of chronic conditions in adults (P<0.001) and of pediatric care (P = 0.001), but not of adult preventive care. All AQC groups met 2009 budget targets and earned surpluses. Total BCBS payments to AQC groups, including bonuses for quality, are likely to have exceeded the estimated savings in year 1. Conclusions The AQC system was associated with a modest slowing of spending growth and improved quality of care in 2009. Savings were achieved through changes in referral patterns rather than through changes in utilization. The long-term effect of the AQC system on spending growth depends on future budget targets and providers’ ability to further improve efficiencies in practice. (Funded by the Commonwealth Fund and others.)

BACKGROUND Spending and quality under global budgets remain unknown beyond 2 years. We evaluated spending and quality measures during the first 4 years of the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Alternative Quality Contract (AQC). METHODS We compared spending and quality among enrollees whose physician organizations entered the AQC from 2009 through 2012 with those among persons in control states. We studied spending changes according to year, category of service, site of care, experience managing risk contracts, and price versus utilization. We evaluated process and outcome quality. RESULTS In the 2009 AQC cohort, medical spending on claims grew an average of $62.21 per enrollee per quarter less than it did in the control cohort over the 4-year period (P<0.001). This amount is equivalent to a 6.8% savings when calculated as a proportion of the average post-AQC spending level in the 2009 AQC cohort. Analogously, the 2010, 2011, and 2012 cohorts had average savings of 8.8% (P<0.001), 9.1% (P<0.001), and 5.8% (P = 0.04), respectively, by the end of 2012. Claims savings were concentrated in the outpatient-facility setting and in procedures, imaging, and tests, explained by both reduced prices and reduced utilization. Claims savings were exceeded by incentive payments to providers during the period from 2009 through 2011 but exceeded incentive payments in 2012, generating net savings. Improvements in quality among AQC cohorts generally exceeded those seen elsewhere in New England and nationally. CONCLUSIONS As compared with similar populations in other states, Massachusetts AQC enrollees had lower spending growth and generally greater quality improvements after 4 years. Although other factors in Massachusetts may have contributed, particularly in the later part of the study period, global budget contracts with quality incentives may encourage changes in practice patterns that help reduce spending and improve quality. (Funded by the Commonwealth Fund and others.)

No abstract