In this article we suggest that events and contexts relevant to the initiation and regulation of intentional behavior can function either to support autonomy (i.e., to promote choice) or to control behavior (i.e., to pressure one toward specific outcomes). Research herein reviewed indicates that this distinction is relevant to specific external events and to general interpersonal contexts as well as to specific internal events and to general personality orientations. That is, the distinction is relevant whether one's analysis focuses on social psychological variables or on personality variables. The research review details those contextual and person factors that tend to promote autonomy and those that tend to control. Furthermore, it shows that autonomy support has generally been associated with more intrinsic motivation, greater interest, less pressure and tension, more creativity, more cognitive flexibility, better conceptual learning, a more positive emotional tone, higher self-esteem, more trust, greater persistence of behavior change, and better physical and psychological health than has control. Also, these results have converged across different assessment procedures, different research methods, and different subject populations. On the basis or these results, we present an organismic perspective in which we argue that the regulation of intentional behavior varies along a continuum from autonomous (i.e.. self-determined) to controlled. The relation of this organismic perspective to historical developments in empirical psychology is discussed, with a particular emphasis on its implications for the study of social psychology and personality. For several decades American psychology was dominated by associationist theories. Assuming that behavior is controlled by peripheral mechanisms, these theories held that the initiation of behavior is a function of stimulus inputs such as external contingencies of reinforcement (Skinner, 1953) or internal drive stimulations (Hull, 1943) and that the regulation of behavior is a function of associative bonds between inputs and behaviors that develop through reinforcement processes. With that general perspective, the central processing of information was not part of the explanatory system, so concepts such as intention were considered irrelevant to the determination of behavior. During the 1950s and 1960s, associationist theories gave way to cognitive theories in which the processing of information was assumed to play an important role in the determination of behavior. On the basis of this assumption, the initiation of behavior was theorized to be a function of expectations about behavior-outcome contingencies and of the psychological value of outcomes (e.g., Atkinson, 1964; Tolman, 1959; Vroom, 1964), and the regulation of behavior was seen as a process of comparing one's current state to a standard (i.e., the desired outcome) and then acting to reduce the discrepancy (e.g., Kanfer, 1975; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Thus, the cognitive perspective shifted the focus...

Little children love to play and to learn. They are active, curious, and eager to engage their environments, and when they do they learn. To some extent adults also love to play and to learn. When people are playing and learning in this eager and willing way, they are intrinsically motivated. Throughout life, when they are in their healthiest states, they are active and interested, and the intrinsically motivated behaviors that result help them acquire knowledge about themselves and their world.

Few things are more intrinsically motivating than the opportunity to test one's ideas against the challenges provided by other theorists and researchers. In writing the target article we invited such challenges by contrasting our work with other current theories and by making clear, and sometimes controversial, claims. Accordingly, we looked forward to the commentaries with great excitement, mixed with a bit of anxiety, anticipating strong and pointed arguments, which we believe to be the best nutriment for continued theoretical growth.After reviewing the range of comments, we feel appreciative. The comments are indeed pointed, and provoked us to specify our propositions and predictions even further and to make even more direct comparisons with the assumptions and foci of other theories that were used in the commentaries. In several instances the comments suggested specific new ideas and testable hypotheses that have the potential to spawn informative research. Each of the 11 commentaries seriously engaged the self-determination theory (SDT) framework in the spirit of scientific dialog, at times critically and with the fervor that often characterizes an active and socially relevant field of human inquiry. Among the major themes we address in our response are the following: Psychological Inquiry

Vitality, or the energy available to the self, is a salient and functionally significant indicator of health and motivation. Previous models (e.g., Baumeister & Vohs, 2007) have suggested how such energy can be depleted but have focused less on how it can be maintained or enhanced. In this article, we describe a model of energy and vitality based on self‐determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). We review substantial evidence that, whereas the self‐controlling regulation of behavior depletes vitality and energy, the autonomous self‐regulation of behavior does not. A growing number of experimental and field studies also suggest that vitality and energy are enhanced by activities that satisfy basic psychological needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy. Lifestyles focused on extrinsic goals are less conducive to need satisfaction and thus engender less vitality. We conclude that social psychological factors associated with need satisfaction have important implications for health and vitality and for informing interventions.

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Physicians used either an autonomy-supportive or a controlling interpersonal style to counsel smokers based on National Cancer Institute guidelines. Physician autonomy support was rated from audiotapes, and patients' perceived competence and autonomous motivation for quitting were self-reported on questionnaires. Validated point prevalences for 6, 12, and 30 months and for continuous cessation were examined. The intervention did not have a direct effect on quit rates; however, structural equation modeling supported the self-determination process model of smoking cessation. The model indicated that the autonomy-supportive intervention was rated as more autonomy supportive, that rated autonomy support predicted autonomous motivation, and that autonomous motivation predicted cessation at all points in time. Perceived competence contributed independent variance to cessation only at 6 months.

Organismic theories and recent research suggest that environments that do not support growth and self-expression are associated with valuing financial success relatively more than affiliation, community feeling, and self-acceptance. This prediction was investigated in a heterogenous sample of 18year-olds using a variety of methods and informants. Teenagers who rated the importance of financial success aspirations relatively high compared to other values were found to have mothers who were less nurturant. Further, materially oriented teenagers grew up in less advantageous socioeconomic circumstances and were raised by mothers who especially valued the teens' financial success. Discussion focuses on explicating the different ways values are acquired.

The concepts of self-regulation and autonomy are examined within an organizational framework. We begin by retracing the historical origins of the organizational viewpoint in early debates within the field of biology between vitalists and reductionists, from which the construct of self-regulation emerged. We then consider human autonomy as an evolved behavioral, developmental, and experiential phenomenon that operates at both neurobiological and psychological levels and requires very specific supports within higher order social organizations. We contrast autonomy or true self-regulation with controlling regulation (a nonautonomous form of intentional behavior) in phenomenological and functional terms, and we relate the forms of regulation to the developmental processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization. Subsequently, we describe how self-regulation versus control may be characterized by distinct neurobiological underpinnings, and we speculate about some of the adaptive advantages that may underlie the evolution of autonomy. Throughout, we argue that disturbances of autonomy, which have both biological and psychological etiologies, are central to many forms of psychopathology and social alienation.