Electoral participation in the United States is examined to provide a clearer account of the effect of the registration requirement on individual voting behavior. Pooling NES data from 1980, 1984, and 1988, I first model, with traditional and selection bias techniques, the full electorate to distinguish among three groups: nonregistrants, registered nonvoters, and voters. Analyses limited to recent movers then reported to understand more fully the forces associated with the actual decision calculi of registering and voting. The influences of many factors commonly accepted as important determinants of voting are disentangled, and their effect at each stage is ascertained. Factors yielding inconsistent effects in previ research or believed to be unimportant—such as race, gender, attitudes toward the candidates, and trust government—are shown to deserve closer scrutiny by electoral scholars.

One manner in which Presidents attempt to have an enduring policy influence is through the appointment of like-minded justices to the Supreme Court. This article empirically examines Dahl's (1957) hypothesis that justices actually support the policy preferences of the Presidents who appoint them. We study concordance with new data for measuring presidential preferences in the domains of social and economic policy and by incorporating the notion of judicial change over time. We measure presidential preferences for the modern Presidents, Franklin Roosevelt through Bill Clinton, with a survey taken from a random sample of political science scholars who study the Presidency We measure the voting behavior of the President's Supreme Court appointees through their votes in civil liberties and economics cases from 1937 to 1994. Presidents appear to be reasonably successful in their appointments in the short run, but justices on average appear to deviate over time away from the Presidents who appointed them.

Across Western democracies, individuals frequently vote for different parties in different elections. A variety of explanations have been proposed for this behavior. In the European context, scholars have focused on the idea that individuals may vote for different parties because some elections are less important than others (i.e., are “second-order” elections). In the U.S. context, scholars have focused on the possibility that individuals might vote for different parties because they care about how the two chambers will affect policy outcomes. In this article, the authors test among four alternative motivations for vote switching, two predicated on the notion that individuals treat one of the elections as second-order and two predicated on the notion that individuals care about policy outcomes from both chambers. The tests are performed by analyzing Euro-barometer survey data on individual voting behavior in European national and European Parliament elections. The authors find support for all four motivations.

That individual preferences may he aggregated into a meaningful collective decision using the Condorcet criterion of majority choice is one of the central tenets of democracy. But that individual preferences may not yield majority winners is one of the classic findings of the social choice literature. Given this problem, social choice theorists have attempted to estimate the probability of Condorcet winners, given certain empirical or theoretical conditions. We shall estimate the probabilities of Condorcet winners and intransitive aggregate orders for various numbers of individuals with strong or weak preference orders across various numbers of alternatives. We find, using computer simulation, a stark contrast between these estimates assuming strong individual preferences and the estimates allowing for individuals' indifference between pairs of alternatives. In contrast to earlier work, which depends on the strong-preference assumption, we suggest that the problem is most acute for small committee decision making and least acute for mass elections with few alternatives.

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