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While many studies have documented deviations from the Law of One Price in international settings, evidence is scarce on the extent to which consumers take advantage of price differentials and engage in cross border shopping. We use data from 287 Swedish municipalities to estimate how responsive alcohol sales are to foreign prices, and relate the sensitivity to the location's distance to the border. Typical results suggest that the elasticity with respect to the foreign price is around 0.4 in the border region; moving 200 (400) kilometers inland reduces it to 0.2 (0.1). Given that cross country price differences for alcohol and other products are often caused by taxes, our evidence has implications for the debate on tax competition/harmonization.

We use daily data to examine price responses in the Swedish gasoline market to changes in the Rotterdam spot price, exchange rates and taxes. The distribution of price adjustments by a leading retail chain, for the period January 1980 to December 1996, is symmetric with no small adjustments. An error correction model shows that, in the short run, prices gradually move towards the long-run equilibrium in response to cost shocks. There is some evidence that, also in the short run, prices are stickier downwards than upwards. Prices respond more rapidly to exchange rate movements than to the spot market price. Our analysis emphasizes that to fully understand price adjustments it is necessary to examine data sets where the sample frequency at least matches that of price adjustments.

Many empirical studies have rejected the law of one price. That prices of a good differ across locations has been explained by differences in product attributes and costs of local inputs, transport costs, trade barriers, and that buyers have imperfect information about prices in different locations; see Penelopi K. Goldberg and Michael M. Knetter (1997) for a survey. We examine the law of one price in situations where none of the mentioned reasons for its failure can be invoked. It has also been suggested that deviations from the law of one price are a consequence of rigid nominal prices and that different countries typically have different currencies. We explore if this can contribute to our understanding of deviations from the law of one price. Our data is taken from three Scandinavian duty-free outlets where each product (at the same location) has price tags in at least two currencies. Hence, a consumer has the option to choose between several prices for the same identical good. In such a setting there is a strong prior that the law of one price (LOP henceforward) holds well. However, the potential for arbitrage will arise since nominal prices are not continuously adjusted while exchange rates fluctuate daily. Based on standard tests, we reject LOP at all duty-free outlets. Given that LOP does not hold here, it is less surprising that many previous studies have found that prices of similar products at different locations differ significantly. Nevertheless, the main conclusion of the paper is that in this "natural experiment", LOP remains a useful guide to the behavior of relative prices. As deviations become large, nominal prices are adjusted to reduce the deviation from LOP, thereby limiting arbitrage opportunities. The patterns at the duty-free outlets suggest that there is a band of inaction so that "small" deviations from LOP may persist (for almost a decade in one case), but that large deviations quickly lead firms to adjust relative prices. The findings are consistent with costly arbitrage and fixed costs of adjusting nominal prices.

We examine the demand for wines in Sweden using five years of weekly data on sales, advertising, and expert reviews. The effect of a favorable review peaks in the week after publication with an increase in demand of 6 percent, and the effect remains significant for more than 20 weeks. We find small demand-enhancing effects of neutral reviews and no evidence of important negative effects from unfavorable reviews. Restrictions on the state-owned monopoly retailer and the exogenous timing of a subset of the reviews support a causal interpretation of the effects of reviews on demand. (JEL D12, L66, L81, M31, M37)

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