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We summarize a conference on scientific inquiry bringing together science educators, cognitive scientists and philosophers of science with three goals: 1. to establish how much consensus exists about scientific inquiry, 2. to discuss implications of that consensus for teaching science, 3. to identify areas where consensus is lacking to establish where further research and discussion would be most valuable.

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Cognitive psychology's descriptions of an individual's knowledge resemble those philosophers' offer of scientific theory. Both offer resources for conceptual change teaching. Yet the similarities mask tensionsphilosophers stress rationality and psychologists focus on causal structure. Both domains distinguish two kinds of change in knowledge structures-one common and cumulative, the other rare and noncumulative. The structures facilitate incremental development but resist major revisions. Unless instruction actively induces restructuring, students' knowledge will be confused and incomplete.Knowledge is largely organized by schemata, representing the significant concepts and relations in a domain. But using knowledge also requires procedures for recalling, applying and revising schemata.Questions discussed include:should we present a theory in the context of justification-where knowledge claims are systematically but ahistorically delineated; and when in the context of development-where knowledge claims are initially developed? How can prototypical examples facilitate schema acquisition and appropriate retrieval? How can individuals be made active participants in the restructuring process? How can the need for restructuring be motivated? To what extent should we stress the historical and rational development of modern science? Are educators prepared to employ complex teaching strategies identified by researchers?To what extent do students' naive theories parallel early stages of science?

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