This study examines the potential profit of technical trading strategies among 10 emerging equity markets of Latin American and Asia: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. We use daily inflation adjusted returns for the January 1982 to April 1995 period. Ten different variable moving average trading models are assessed through a bootstrapping simulation. The average buy-sell returns difference after trading costs for each strategy and country are compared to a buy and hold strategy. Taiwan, Mexico and Thailand emerge as markets where technical trading strategies may be profitable. We found no strong evidence of profitability for the other markets.

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RESUMOO presente trabalho analisa a estrutura de controle direta e indireta de empresas brasileiras no final de 1998. Nossos resultados revelam um elevado grau de concentração de capital votante no Brasil. Mesmo nos casos em que não há um acionista controlador, o maior acionista detém uma participação significativa dos direitos sobre voto e a companhia é, geralmente, controlada por seus três maiores acionistas. Concluímos também que a utilização de pirâmides como um mecanismo para manutenção de controle a um custo menor, isto é, com investimento menor no capital total, não é muito comum. Os acionistas controladores brasileiros investem em média muito mais do que o mínimo necessário para manter o controle nas suas companhias.Palavras-chaves: governança corporativa; controle; propriedade; acionista controlador. ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the control structure of Brazilian public companies at the end of 1998. We show a high degree of ownership concentration. Even when there is no majority shareholder, the largest one owns a significant portion of the voting capital, and the company is, on average, controlled by its three largest shareholders. We also conclude that the utilization of pyramid structures does not appear to be an effort to avoid the one share-one vote rule in Brazilian companies.

This study investigates the effects of the corporate governance structure on market valuation and dividend payout of Brazilian companies. The empirical results indicate a high degree of ownership and control concentration. We can also note a significant difference between the voting and total capital owned by the largest shareholders, mainly through the existence of non-voting shares, pyramidal structures, and shareholding agreements. These mechanisms seem to be used by controlling shareholders to keep the firm's control without having to own 50% of the total capital. The evidence also reveals that there is a relationship between governance structure, market valuation, and dividend policy in Brazil.

We survey board practices in Brazil. Brazilian companies are commonly controlled by family groups or through shareholders agreements. Controlling shareholders hold a very large portion of voting shares, much more than the minimum necessary to retain control. There is widespread evidence of shareholder expropriation, legal protection is weak, and stock issuance has been halted by low valuations and tax avoidance. Half of the boards are either too small or too big. Board committees are ineffective. Board procedures are rarely formalized and board members and CEOs are not evaluated in most cases. Most board members are not shareholders. No more than 21 percent of board members are independent and only 2 percent of them are elected by independent shareholder groups. It is likely the improvements in board structure and procedures will be restricted to large public corporations with foreign stock ownership while most companies avoid going public.