RESUMOO presente trabalho analisa a estrutura de controle direta e indireta de empresas brasileiras no final de 1998. Nossos resultados revelam um elevado grau de concentração de capital votante no Brasil. Mesmo nos casos em que não há um acionista controlador, o maior acionista detém uma participação significativa dos direitos sobre voto e a companhia é, geralmente, controlada por seus três maiores acionistas. Concluímos também que a utilização de pirâmides como um mecanismo para manutenção de controle a um custo menor, isto é, com investimento menor no capital total, não é muito comum. Os acionistas controladores brasileiros investem em média muito mais do que o mínimo necessário para manter o controle nas suas companhias.Palavras-chaves: governança corporativa; controle; propriedade; acionista controlador. ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the control structure of Brazilian public companies at the end of 1998. We show a high degree of ownership concentration. Even when there is no majority shareholder, the largest one owns a significant portion of the voting capital, and the company is, on average, controlled by its three largest shareholders. We also conclude that the utilization of pyramid structures does not appear to be an effort to avoid the one share-one vote rule in Brazilian companies.

The aim of the present study is to identify the factors affecting the auditing and consulting expenditures in Brazilian public companies. The current study was motivated by the lack of studies on auditing and consulting expenses in Brazil, whereas this matter has been researched for years in other countries. Data on Brazil are scarce because the disclosure of spending on auditing and consulting services provided by independent auditors only became mandatory in 2009. The disclosure of these data enables the analysis of the drivers of the fees paid by companies for these services. In this study, we only analyzed the expenditures for consultancy services provided by the same auditing firm; that is, we ignored all spending on other consultants. The results indicate that audit fees are positively related to company size, corporate governance quality, and the Big Four status of the auditor. In terms of consulting expenses, there is a positive relationship between company size and Big Four status, but there is no significant relationship with corporate governance.

This study analyzes if the presence of women on boards of directors and in top executive positions has impact on firm value and performance. The international literature shows that there is not a unique and defined relation between female participation on boards of directors and top executive positions and firm value and performance. Some studies show a positive effect of the female participation, whereas others present a negative or no significant relation. This work studies the female influence on firm value and performance in Brazil. The analysis of 383 publicly traded companies from 2002 to 2009 indicates that the relationship between the presence of women in top management, firm value and performance is, in general, not statistically significant in Brazil. However, in some econometric models, companies with at least two women in the board of directors tend to have higher value and better performance.

The aim of this study is to identify the relationship between executive compensation, firm value and performance in Brazil. The literature provides mixed results but most studies show that firms with higher executive compensation tend to have greater value and performance in comparison with companies with lower compensation. We analyze a unique Brazilian database to test this hypothesis. This paper differs from previous studies on executive remuneration in Brazil since it uses dynamic models, estimated by systemic generalized method of moments, to control potential sources of endogeneity. The analysis of 420 Brazilian companies from 2002 to 2009 does not indicate a significant relation between executive compensation and firm value (price-to-book and Tobin´s Q), suggesting that companies that pay greater executive remuneration do not have higher value. Furthermore there is no significant relation between executive compensation and operational performance (ROA and sales growth).

Purpose -To study the impacts of elections and succession processes on SOE stocks.Design/methodology/approach -Through events studies we longitudinally investigate the impacts of political events (elections) and of succession processes on SOE stocks over more than 20 years. We also document changes in management, showing that SOEs face greater turnover in management than their private peers. Stock quotations were obtained from Economática and company and executive data were retrieved from the B3 and CVM.Findings -There is some but not a general impact of elections and succession processes on SOEs. More recently, the impacts have increased. CEO turnover is greater in SOEs than in their private peers and changes in management are greater in cases of power shifts.Originality/value -We shed light on phenomena that happen frequently in Brazil: CEO successions in SOEs and political events impacting SOEs.