We analyze the channels through which institutional quality can impact the corruption–growth nexus. To do this, we develop an endogenous growth model and test its implications empirically, through panel data models using GMM and PSTR settings. Our sample consists of 136 developed and developing countries analyzed over the period 1984–2015. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that (i) the corruption–growth relation can be subject to nonlinearities highly influenced by countries’ institutional development; and (ii) private investment and public spending are two main channels through which institutional quality affects, positively or negatively, the relation between corruption and economic growth.
In this paper, we reassess the link between corruption, economic growth, and inflation. To this end, we build an endogenous growth model with transaction costs in which a corruption sector allows households evading from taxation. Several results emerge. First, seigniorage acts as a tax on corruption and therefore allows reducing the aggregate level of corruption in equilibrium. Second, corruption increases both the growth-maximizing and the welfare-maximizing seigniorage rate. Third, corruption can be identified as an autonomous channel of nonsuperneutrality of money. Fourth, our model exhibits a U-shaped relation between corruption and inflation, contrasting with previous literature. On this last point, an empirical investigation based on a structural threshold regression framework confirms the predictions of the theoretical model. 1 | INTRODUCTION In many countries, corruption 1 within the public administration remains an important cause of poor macroeconomic performance. In particular, corruption is often viewed as detrimental for eco
Cette note réexamine la relation entre la corruption fiscale et l’inflation. Dans un modèle de croissance endogène avec monnaie, elle met en évidence l’existence d’un effet de seuil entre la corruption et l’inflation. Contrairement à la littérature existante, nous montrons que c’est seulement au-delà d’un certain seuil de corruption que l’effet de la corruption sur l’inflation est positif. En deçà de ce seuil, l’effet de la corruption sur l’inflation devient négatif. Cet effet est d’autant plus important que le taux d’imposition est élevé.
Cet article vise à étudier la relation entre qualité institutionnelle, inflation et régime monétaire optimal. À cette fin, nous passons en revue tant la littérature théorique qu’empirique afin d’en extraire les principaux enseignements pour les pays en développement et pour les pays développés. Nous montrons, en particulier, qu’un régime de ciblage d’inflation où la cible est déterminée à partir de l’ensemble des caractéristiques structurelles et institutionnelles de l’économie semble être le régime monétaire le plus pertinent pour les pays en développement. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que pour les pays développés, et en particulier les pays européens, le choix de l’union monétaire n’est pas forcément pertinent lorsque les économies qui la composent se caractérisent par des niveaux de qualité institutionnelle très divergents.
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