No abstract

This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994 ) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman-Helpman politically-determined export policy is identical to the rent-shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically-determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator. Copyright � 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation � 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

This paper compares market profit and social welfare levels between differentiated Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. We start with a basic model in which a firm with a production technology can license its new technology to a potential rival who can use the technology to produce a differentiated product and compete with the incumbent firm. It is found that for any given technology level, Bertrand competition is necessarily more profitable but less socially desirable, due to its higher royalty rate. By contrast, if the licensee firm is an incumbent firm, the results hold if the technology level is high. Furthermore, if we assume the licensor firm can engage in product innovation and choose its optimal technology endogenously and the R&D efficiency is high (low), the welfare ranking is reversed (still holds).

This paper studies the patent licensing decision of an insider patentee when two firms engage in a mixed (Cournot-Bertrand or Bertrand-Cournot) competition where one firm adopts the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy and vice versa. If either the fixed fee or royalty is applied, then the licensor prefers the fixed fee when the licensor takes the quantity strategy, while the licensee uses the price strategy (Cournot-Bertrand). If the two-part tariff is applied, then the two-part tariff is more likely to be adopted by the licensor under Cournot-Bertrand than under Bertrand-Cournot competition.JEL classification: L13, L22, D43 I . I n t r o d u c t i o nMost of the existing literature on the firm's strategic competition assumes that the firms use the same type of strategy -for example, quantity competition or price competition. Cournot competition is the famous quantity versus quantity competition, while Bertrand competition is the famous price versus price competition. However, in the real business world, it is not necessary for firms in the same industry to use the same type of strategy. If one firm uses the quantity strategy while the other uses the price strategy, then this competition can be called a Cournot-Bertrand mixed competition. 1 Sato (1996) pointed out that in Japan's home electronics market, Matsushita tends to use the quantity strategy, while Sanyo prefers to use the price strategy. Tremblay et al. (2013) noted that in the automobile industry, Saturn and Scion adopt the price strategy, while Honda and Subaru adopt the quantity strategy.In addition to the duopolistic competition with a symmetric competition strategy, Singh and Vives (1984) further analysed mixed competition strategies (Cournot-Bertrand). They allowed a firm to endogenously choose quantity or price to be their own optimal competition strategy. However, since the main purpose of the paper is to examine the effects of mixed competition on patent licensing decision, here the endogenous choice of the optimal competition strategy will not

No abstract