This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994 ) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman-Helpman politically-determined export policy is identical to the rent-shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically-determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator. Copyright � 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation � 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
This paper aims to help Asian trade negotiators by examining the processes and results of the Uruguay Round. Analysts argue that trade negotiations are based on mercantilistic rules. But the actual outcome of the Uruguay Round suggests that trade bargaining was not based on strict reciprocity. In terms of tariff reductions, Asian economies received more than they gave, but relative to tariff bindings, Asian economies gave more than they received. Asian economies that undertook trade reforms prior to the trade talks did not lose bargaining power. The paper also presents econometric evidence on the determinants of bargaining power of nations. Copyright (c) 2005 The Earth Institute at Columbia University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.