Summary It is widely believed that economic institutions such as competitive markets, the banking system, and the structure of property rights are essential for economic development. But why economic institutions vary across countries and what are their deep origins is still a question that is widely debated in the developmental economics literature. In this study, we provide an empirical test for the provocative hypothesis that the prevalence of infectious diseases influenced the formation of personality traits, cultural values, and even morality at the regional level (the so called Parasite‐ Stress Theory of Values and Sociality), which then shaped economic institutions across countries. Using the prevalence of pathogens as an instrument for cultural traits such as individualism, we show in a two‐stage least squares analysis that various economic institutions, measured by different areas of the index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation, have their deep origins in the historical prevalence of infectious diseases across countries. Our causal identification strategy suggests that cultural values affect economic institutions even after controlling for a number of confounding variables, geographic controls, and for different sub‐samples of countries. We further show that the results are robust to four alternative measures of economic and political institutions.

It is widely believed that individualistic societies, which emphasize personal freedom, award social status for accomplishment, and favor minimal government intervention, are more prone to higher levels of income inequality compared to more collectivist societies, which value conformity, loyalty, and tradition and favor more interventionist policies. The results in this paper, however, challenge this conventional view. Drawing on a rich literature in biology and evolutionary psychology, we test the provocative Parasite Stress Theory of Values, which suggests a possible link between the historical prevalence of infectious diseases, the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism and differences in income inequality across countries. Specifically, in a two-stage least squares analysis, we use the historical prevalence of infectious diseases as an instrument for individualistic values, which, in the next stage, predict the level of income inequality, measured by the net GINI coefficient from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Our findings suggest that societies with more individualistic values have significantly lower net income inequality. The results are robust even after controlling for a number of confounding factors such as economic development, legal origins, religion, human capital, other cultural values, economic institutions, and geographical controls.

This paper empirically assesses the influence of intelligence on a shadow economy, using data from 158 countries, over the period 1999-2007. The results provide strong evidence for the claim that intelligence is negatively associated with an underground economy. This paper establishes that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in IQ is associated with an 8.5 percentage point reduction in a shadow economy relative to GDP. The negative effect of intelligence remains intact when controlled for conventional antecedents of a shadow economy.2

Final version working paper.Please cite as: Salahodjaev, R. (2015). Democracy and economic growth: The role of intelligence in cross-country regressions. Intelligence, 50, 228-234. Highlights:-This article examines the effect of democracy and intelligence on economic growth.-This article reports novel evidence of a new channel through which democracy has impact on economic growth.-Weak democratic regimes are harmful for economic growth in low-IQ nations. -This article interacts democracy and intelligence AbstractEmpirical literature has long conjectured that institutional arrangements, proxied by democracy, social capital and intelligence, are relevant determinants in cross-country differences in economic performance. Related literature, however, predominantly documents that democracy has either a negative or not significant impact on economic growth, while intelligence is assumed to have strong and direct effect on economic performance. We propose that that the effect of democratization is mediated by the degree of the approval to such policies, and that intelligence may alleviate or diminish the negative effect of weak institutions on economic growth. We empirically, investigate the interactive effect of democracy and intelligence on economic growth, using data from 93 nations, over the period 1970-2013. The results show that the relationship link between democracy and the real GDP growth varies with a nation's level of cognitive abilities. The results remain robust to various estimation techniques, control variables and time periods.