What humans need: Flourishing in aristotelian PhilosoPhy and selF-determination theory richard m. ryan, randall r. curren, and edWard l. deci in this chapter, two psychologists (ryan and deci) team up with a philosopher (curren) to describe an account of human wellness or flourishing that is connected to perennial debates about human nature and what constitutes its most vital and fullest expressions. specifically, we explore the concept of eudaimonia, which derives from neo-aristotelian perspectives according to which there are human potentialities whose fulfillment is essential to wellbeing and happiness-potentialities whose fulfillment constitutes "the good" for human beings when it exhibits qualities of goodness and is experienced as meaningful and satisfying (curren, 2010). We then examine the tenets and findings of self-determination theory (sdt; deci & ryan, 2012; ryan & deci, 2000) with respect to eudaimonist views and, specifically, evidence derived from sdt that there are universal needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness whose satisfaction is central to human flourishing. We focus in particular on the importance of autonomy, which plays an essential and
Ethical dimensions of friendship have rarely been explicitly addressed as aspects of friendship quality in studies of children's peer relationships. This study identifies aspects of moral virtue significant for friendship, as a basis for empirically investigating the role of ethical qualities in children's friendship assessments and aspirations. We introduce a eudaimonic conception of friendship quality, identify aspects of moral virtue foundational to such quality, review and contest some grounds on which children have been regarded as not mature enough to have friendships that require virtue, and report a qualitative study of the friendship assessments and aspirations of children aged nine and ten (n = 83). In focus group sessions conducted in ten schools across Great Britain, moral qualities figured prominently in children's assessments of friendship quality. The findings provide evidence of children having friendships exhibiting mutual respect, support, and valuing of each other's good character.
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This article explores some general considerations bearing on the question of whether virtue can be measured. What is moral virtue? What are measurement and evaluation, and what do they presuppose about the nature of what is measured or evaluated? What are the prospective contexts of, and purposes for, measuring or evaluating virtue, and how would these shape the legitimacy, methods, and likely success of measurement and evaluation? We contrast the realist presuppositions of virtue and measurement of virtue with the behavioral operationalism of a common conception of measurement in psychometrics. We suggest a realist and non-reductive conceptualization of the measurability of virtue. We then discuss three possible educational contexts in which the measurement of virtue might be pursued: high-stakes testing and accountability schemes, the evaluation of programs in character education, and routine student evaluation. We argue that highstakes testing of virtue would be ill-advised and counterproductive. We make some suggestions for how program evaluation in character education might proceed, and offer some examples of evaluation of student virtue-related learning. We conclude that virtue acquisition might be measured in a population of students accurately enough for program evaluation while also arguing that student and program evaluation do not require comprehensive evaluations of how virtuous individual students are. Routine student evaluation will typically focus on specific aspects of virtue acquisition, and program evaluations can measure the aggregate progress of virtue acquisition in all its aspects while evaluating only limited aspects of the learning of individual students.
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