M arket share contracts, a form of loyalty discounts, where the discount is contingent on the buyer meeting or exceeding a target share of total procurement, are used in many business to business (B2B) settings. We study the impact of such contracts on demand allocation, prices, and welfare in a setting where a single central B2B buyer procures multiple units of a product on behalf of a set of users with heterogeneous preferences. We find that linear pricing creates a demand distortion, which goes away with the use of market share contracts. These contracts serve as strategic tools for vendors whose products are strongly preferred by a substantial fraction of the users in the buying organization to shift the locus of competition and extract away rents from weaker rivals, and sometimes from buyers. The impact of such contracts on the welfare of the buyers is therefore ambiguous, but when these contracts are used, the overall surplus goes up as disutility from demand distortion is avoided. While both quantity threshold contracts and two-part tariffs can replicate the efficiency properties of market share contracts when demand is deterministic, they cannot guarantee the avoidance of demand distortion when buyer demand is uncertain.
Manufacturers and distributors of expensive implants and other medical supplies often require buyers to sign non‐disclosure agreements treating all information concerning negotiated prices as trade secrets. Such agreements make it difficult for hospitals to obtain accurate pricing benchmarks. To save on procurement costs and to obtain pricing information, most hospitals in the United States join group purchasing organizations (GPOs). GPOs are believed to lower procurement costs by aggregating hospitals’ demand. Whether GPOs indeed add value to the healthcare supply chain and produce actual savings for hospitals are debated policy issues, as evidenced by the ongoing discussions on the topic in the US Congress. Some hospitals procure using GPO contracts, and some try to improve on prices available via GPO contracts, negotiating custom contracts directly with the GPO vendors. Using a game‐theoretic model, we prove that GPOs that operate independently and allow for custom contracting limit the benefit of demand aggregation to smaller hospitals only. The larger hospitals gain primarily from using the GPO as an infomediary to obtain critical pricing information benchmarks. Our results further explain why the introduction of custom contracting lowers the value of access to this pricing information for the hospitals, and how the savings through custom contracting can be misleading. We reveal how GPO vendors can exploit information asymmetry about their prices and earn even higher profits, and why, contrary to the industry's belief, the resulting savings are never higher for any hospital, not even for the larger ones when the GPOs allow custom contracting.
Many software product firms release a public beta prior to launching its product. Public betas are adopted by innovator consumers and firms use free feedback from these consumers to improve the quality of the product. While trying out the public beta, innovators also learn their product preferences accurately. In addition, opinions expressed by the innovators about the software on public forums like blogs, etc., can introduce a perception bias about the product's quality among the imitator consumers. Therefore, there are demand and cost side tradeoffs in introducing public betas. In addition to public beta, firms can introduce product trials along with the product. Product trials serve as a learning mechanism for all consumers (innovators and imitators), unlike in the case of public betas where this benefit accrues only to innovators. We examine the firm's optimal strategies to introduce public beta and/or product trial. We show that introducing public beta does not necessarily result in a higher‐quality product. However, even when the quality is lower, consumer surplus and social welfare can be higher. Interestingly, while introducing public beta in addition to trial may appear to be optimal, it may not always be so. We show that similar results hold for products with network effects. We also find that even though the marginal value of quality to consumers is higher for products with network effects, the quality of the product can sometimes be lower than the quality in absence of network effects.
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