Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn the aftermath of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima, German nuclear policy has been reconsidered. This paper demonstrates the economic effects of an accelerated nuclear phase-out on the German electricity generation sector. A detailed optimization model for European electricity markets is used to analyze two scenarios with different lifetimes for nuclear plants (phase-out vs. prolongation). Based on political targets, both scenarios assume significant electricity demand reductions and a high share of generation from renewable energy sources in Germany. Our principal findings are: First, nuclear capacities are mainly replaced by longer lifetimes of existing coal-fired plants and the construction of new gas-fired plants. Second, fossil fuel-based generation and power imports increase, while power exports are reduced in response to the lower nuclear generation. Third, despite the increased fossil generation, challenging climate protection goals can still be achieved within the framework of the considered scenarios. Finally, system costs and electricity prices are clearly higher. We conclude that the generation sector can generally cope with an accelerated nuclear phase-out under the given assumptions. Yet, we emphasize that such a policy requires a substantial and costly transformation of the supply and the demand side.
A high standard of security of electricity supply comes at serious electricity system costs. However, these system costs have to be balanced with the economic costs induced by an insecure supply of electricity. Following a macroeconomic approach, we analyze the economic costs imposed by potential power interruptions in Germany. Using an extensive dataset on industries and households, we estimate both Values of Lost Load and the associated hourly costs of power interruptions for different German regions and sectors. We find that interruption costs vary significantly over time, between sectors and regions. Peaking at midday on a Monday in December at 750 Mio € per hour, the average total national outage costs amount to approximately 430 Mio € per hour. A missing gigawatt hour creates average outage costs of about 7.6 Mio €.
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. . Surprisingly, we find that the costs of uncertainty are rather limited. Based on our results, we conclude that a commitment regarding nuclear policy reform is only mildly beneficial in terms of system costs. Terms of use: Documents in
There is an ongoing debate on the appropriate auction design for competitive electricity balancing markets. Uniform (UPA) and discriminatory price auctions (DPA), the prevalent designs in use today, are assumed to have dierent properties with regard to prices and eciencies. These properties cannot be thoroughly described using analytical methods due to the complex strategy space in repeated multi-unit multiple bid auctions. Therefore, using an agent-based Q-learning model, we simulate the strategic bidding behaviour in these auctions under a variety of market conditions. We nd that UPAs lead to higher prices in all analysed market settings. This is mainly due to the fact that players engage in bid shading more aggressively. Moreover, small players in UPAs learn to free ride on the price setting of large players and earn higher prots per unit of capacity owned, while they are disadvantaged in DPAs. UPAs also generally feature higher eciencies, but there are exceptions to this observation. If demand is varying and players are provided with additional information about scarcity in the market, market prices increase only in case asymmetric players are present.
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