The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality-linking financial support to borrowing governments' commitment to policy reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects of stricter IMF conditionality depend on domestic partisan politics. More IMF conditions can pressure left-wing governments into undertaking more ambitious reforms with little resistance from partisan rivals on the right; under right governments, however, more conditions hinder reform implementation by heightening resistance from the left while simultaneously reducing leaders' ability to win their support through concessions or compromise. Using data on post-communist IMF programs for the period 1994-2010, we find robust evidence supporting these claims, even after addressing the endogeneity of IMF programs via instrumental variables analysis.

What determines whether countries' institutions attract or deter investment? Although existing theories predict that multinational enterprises (MNEs) avoid locations where institutions cannot constrain public and private actors' opportunistic behavior, we argue host institutions' attractiveness depends on firms' home environment. Home country institutions shape firms' practices and capabilities, thus helping to determine the environments that firms are best prepared to face abroad. We test our predictions using multiple data sets at different levels of analysis: firm‐level data on MNEs' foreign subsidiaries, data on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) positions, and longitudinal data on bilateral FDI flows. We find that states with independent judiciaries are particularly attractive to investment from countries also possessing independent courts. Similarly, countries with low judicial independence disproportionately send FDI to countries lacking independent judiciaries. These findings' implications challenge conventional wisdom: “Good” institutions may not attract all investors, and “bad” institutions may not always deter, as current research suggests.

What determines whether policy environments attract or deter investment? Scholars worried about the vulnerability of market-supporting institutions to political manipulation have identified delegation to independent actors as way to increase policy environments' predictability. Extant arguments, however, risk overgeneralizing from the experience of developed democracies. I argue that investors' response to bureaucratic discretion-agents' leeway to make decisions and act independently of political bodies-depends upon the broader institutional context. Where robust political institutions are lacking, bureaucratic discretion acts as a source of unpredictability that deters investors; conversely, political institutions that share the cost of monitoring help to mitigate uncertainty about how bureaucrats will use discretion in applying regulatory rules. Using survey data from over 600 enterprises in Russia, I find that perceptions of bureaucratic discretion are negatively associated with firm managers' willingness to invest; this effect is particularly pronounced in regions where the institutional environment discourages political competition.

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In authoritarian regimes, repression encourages private actors to censor not only themselves, but also other private actors—a behavior we call “regime-induced private censorship.” We present the results of a correspondence experiment conducted in Russia that investigates the censorship behavior of private media firms. We find that such firms censor third-party advertisements that include anti-regime language, calls for political or non-political collective action, or both. Our results demonstrate the significance of other types of censorship besides state censorship in an important authoritarian regime and contribute to the rapidly growing literature on authoritarian information control.