Purpose
Based on the strategy tripod perspective, this study aims to address how emerging economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs) make a strategic decision of choosing a foreign location for their strategic asset seeking and under what mechanism EMNEs make foreign direct investment (FDI) location choice.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper first reviews the literature on strategy tripod and strategic asset seeking strategy of EMNEs. Then, six cases of Chinese multinational enterprises operating in manufacturing industry have been introduced, emphasizing on interactions within three dimensions of strategy tripod framework, namely, resource-based dimension, industry-based dimension and institution-based dimension. By triangulating with multiple sources of archival and interview data, this paper identified a conceptual model presenting location choice mechanisms.
Findings
Based on a comparative multi-case study, four mechanisms of EMNEs’ location choice when seek strategic asset by FDI within a strategy tripod framework have been revealed. Specifically, EMNEs make their strategic decision of choosing a foreign location for their strategic asset seeking under mechanisms of seeking complementary resources based on industry characteristics; echoing with institutional dimension of home country when exploitation of resource; matching institutional dimension of host country when consider industry fitness; and institutional leveraging combined with understanding of resource and industry dimensions inside strategy tripod.
Originality/value
The findings shed novel insights into the mechanisms under which EMNEs choose their location for strategic asset-seeking FDI. It also broadens the strategy tripod framework by looking deeper into the characteristics of each dimension within a new research context of EMNEs’ FDI location choice.
Purpose
This paper aims to examine different hypotheses concerning the effects of executive incentive on the degree of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) ambidexterity. Specifically, this study provides new insights on how executive equity incentive and executive control right incentive may affect overseas ambidextrous strategy of Chinese enterprises.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used panel data of Chinese manufacturing listed companies in 2006-2015 to explore the relationships between related factors. Hypotheses are tested by using regression analysis.
Findings
This study found that executive equity incentive is positively related to the degree of FDI ambidexterity. It also found that the level at which control right incentives of executive are made has a curvilinear relationship with degree of FDI ambidexterity. Higher level of control right incentive of executive will be associated with higher degree of FDI ambidexterity; however, beyond some level, higher control right incentive of executive will be associated with lower degree of FDI ambidexterity.
Research limitations/implications
This paper has implications to future research and companies’ everyday practice on ambidextrous FDI strategy.
Originality/value
Based on the principal-agent framework and incentive theory, this paper offers an interesting insight of achieving balance of ambidextrous strategy for Chinese multinational enterprises by involving the different roles of executive equity incentive and executive control right incentive they played.
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