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In popular discussion, much has been made of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners-the general presumption being that this is harmful to the home economy. However, in a trade policy context this may not be the case. If the policy outcome absent any foreign lobbying is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, foreign lobbying may reduce such barriers and possibly raise welfare. Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the United States, this paper investigates this question empirically. Tariffs and nontariff barriers are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well-known Grossman-Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified suitably to account for the cross-sectoral use of inputs in production (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon with around 50 percent of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Data from more than 40 countries are used in our analysis. Our empirical results validate the predictions of the theoretical model with lobbying competition. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the"welfare-mindedness" of governments in setting trade policy.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Political Economy. The factor proportions model of international trade is one of the most influential theories in international economics. Its central standing in this field has appropriately prompted, particularly recently, intense empirical scrutiny. A substantial and growing body of empirical work has tested the predictions of the theory on the net factor content of a country's trade with the rest of the world, usually under the maintained assumptions of factor price equalization and identical homothetic preferences across trading countries (or under quite specific relaxations of these assumptions). In contrast, this paper uses OECD production and trade data to test the restrictions (derived by Helpman) on the factor content of trade flows that hold even under nonequalization of factor prices and in the absence of any assumptions regarding consumer preferences. In a further contrast with most of the existing literature, which has focused on the factor content of a country's multilateral trade, our tests concern bilateral trade flows, thereby enabling the examination of trade flows between only a subset of countries for which quality data (relatively speaking) are available.We are most grateful to Steve Levitt and two anonymous referees for many detailed comments on this paper. We are also grateful to We find that restrictions implied by the theory cannot be rejected for the vast majority of country pairs considered in our analysis.

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In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context, bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper investigates the relationship between trade protection and lobbying activity empirically. The approach taken in this paper is primarily a structural one. To model the role of foreign and domestic lobbies in determining trade policy, we develop first a theoretical framework building on the wellknown work of Grossman and Helpman (1994); the econometric work that follows is very closely linked to the theory. Our analysis of the data suggests that foreign lobbying activity has significant impact on trade policy -and in the predicted direction: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. We consider also extended specifications in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that have been suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from outside of the theoretical structure described above) and confirm the robustness of our findings in this setting.