In popular discussion, much has been made of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners-the general presumption being that this is harmful to the home economy. However, in a trade policy context this may not be the case. If the policy outcome absent any foreign lobbying is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, foreign lobbying may reduce such barriers and possibly raise welfare. Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the United States, this paper investigates this question empirically. Tariffs and nontariff barriers are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The burden of cardiovascular disease is high in patients with chronic kidney disease or end-stage renal disease. The presence of kidney dysfunction affects the cardiovascular system in multiple ways, including accelerated progression of atherosclerosis and valvular disease, the exacerbation of congestive heart failure, and the development of pericardial disease. This comorbidity results not only from the concordance of shared risk factors, but also from other issues specific to this population, such as systemic inflammation and vascular calcification. Furthermore, both the sensitivity and specificity of noninvasive testing modalities, and the efficacy of several pharmacotherapeutic strategies, are diminished in this population. The exclusion of patients with severe kidney disease from many clinical trials of cardiac interventions raises various therapeutic uncertainties, and kidney disease itself is likely to alter the underlying cardiovascular physiology. In this Review, we discuss aspects of the epidemiology, pathophysiology, and diagnosis of cardiovascular disease in patients with kidney disease, and propose specific, evidence-based recommendations for pharmacological and surgical treatment.

In popular discussion much has been made recently of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners. The general presumption has also been that such interactions have a deleterious effect on the home economy. However, it can be argued that, in a trade policy context, bending policy in a direction that would suit foreigners may not in fact be harmful: If the policy outcome absent any lobbying by foreigners is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, lobbying by foreigners may result in reductions in such barriers and raise consumer surplus (and possibly improve welfare). Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the US, this paper investigates the relationship between trade protection and lobbying activity empirically. The approach taken in this paper is primarily a structural one. To model the role of foreign and domestic lobbies in determining trade policy, we develop first a theoretical framework building on the wellknown work of Grossman and Helpman (1994); the econometric work that follows is very closely linked to the theory. Our analysis of the data suggests that foreign lobbying activity has significant impact on trade policy -and in the predicted direction: Tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. We consider also extended specifications in which we include a large number of additional explanatory variables that have been suggested in the literature as determinants of trade policy (but that emerge from outside of the theoretical structure described above) and confirm the robustness of our findings in this setting.

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