Constructivism in the International Relations literature mainly focuses on the constitutive interaction between international norms and state actions. Few studies explore when ideas at the domestic level matter in foreign policy change. I propose a constructivist account for policy change that emphasizes not only ideas but also material interests as exogenous factors constituted within domestic structures. My empirical analysis in the case of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency reveals important evidence demonstrating the influence of (i) shared normative values, mostly constituted by the foreign policy elite's intersubjective understanding of Turkey's historical roots and cultural ties in the region and (ii) material interests, favored through the “trading state” and framed by the convergence of principled and causal beliefs on policy change. Ideas matter in foreign policymaking when a set of contingent conditions is satisfied: (i) A small group of recognized foreign policy elite has shared normative beliefs and (ii) an enabling political environment exists, particularly a majority government facilitating foreign policy appointments to key positions so that a window of opportunity is provided for policy entrepreneurship.

This study examines the role of oil and gas in the making of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. It argues that Kazakhstan has been following a multi-vector foreign policy in relation to its oil-led development and the geopolitics of exporting oil from this landlocked region. The significance of geopolitical considerations and the resulting pragmatism of Kazakhstan's leadership only allow a limited role for national identity and internal political dynamics in the making of its foreign policy. Kazakhstan's geopolitical imperatives force the country to keep good relations with Russia and China as well as with the US and the EU, as counterbalancing partners. FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION IN DECEMBER 2005 OF an oil pipeline running from Atasu, located in northwestern Kazakhstan, to Alashankou, in China's northwestern Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan) region, there have been growing concerns about Kazakhstan's foreign policy orientation and its increasing cooperation with China. Despite the long-sought agreement between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in June 2006 to transport increased production from the offshore Kashagan field of Kazakhstan to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, substantial talks on building a sea-bed pipeline to connect Kazakh oil to this pipeline are on hold. Rather, Kazakhstan will transport oil from Aktau to Baku by existing tankers and a new large-capacity tanker fleet. Thus, the reluctance of Kazakhstan to build a trans-Caspian pipeline has fuelled concerns over whether Kazakhstan is looking East or West. 1 Foreign policy making is influenced by numerous domestic and international factors. In Kazakhstan, for example, a wide range of determinants should be assessed in terms of their influence on foreign policy. These include the nature of the regime in its post-Soviet state-building process; questions of national identity; the influence of domestic groups, especially clans, on government policy; Kazakhstan's landlocked geography; the interests of neighbouring powers; and the investment of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the rich oil and gas. Above all however, it will be argued here, the questions of under what conditions and to what extent Kazakhstan's oil and gas The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this article and Hasan Ali Karasar and Paul Williams for their help in revising the article. 1 The trans-Caspian pipeline has been planned to be built underwater from the port of Kirik located 76 km from Aktau, Kazakhstan, to the Azerbaijani terminal at Dyunbendi, near Baku.

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Major events since 2014 in the Middle East have brought Turkey's growing energy import dependency and resulting risks into an unease about its energy security. Especially after Turkey's downing of a Russian jetfighter at the Turkish border with Syria on 24 November 2015, policy makers began reconsidering Turkey's diversification of gas supplies. Similarly, Turkey's increasing oil imports from Iraq raised questions about interstate and intra-state conflicts and their implications for energy security in the region since the fall of Mosul in Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on 10 June 2014. The continuing dependency on fossil fuels of the Middle East not only in Turkey's energy mix but also in world energy demand requires further analysis of oil and conflict in the region, no matter how inconvenient or ideologically and emotionally fraught it is. This article addresses the relationship between oil and conflict. Then, it examines the case of Turkey's increasing energy relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to elucidate the implications of interstate and intra-state conflict on regional interdependence in the region. The argument asserts that risks of an abrupt regime change or revolutionary regime formation in the aftermath of civil war in Syria and ethnic or sectarian violence in Iraq should be reevaluated. These risks, highly associated with intra-state conflicts, present challenges for Turkey's energy security and most importantly for human security in the region. Ankara's long-time aspiration of being an energy hub, underlying the country's geostrategic location to diversify suppliers and transportation routes for Europe's gas imports, has been upheld since the inauguration ceremony for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in July 2006. 1 However, there were some limitations such as long-term gas contracts signed with Russia and Iran and lack of infrastructure to transport required volumes of gas CONTACT Pinar Ipek

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