This paper assesses the impact of different types of flexible fiscal rules on the procyclicality of fiscal policy with propensity scores-matching techniques, thus mitigating traditional selfselection problems. It finds that not all fiscal rules have the same impact: the design matters. Specifically, investment-friendly rules reduce the procyclicality of both overall and investment spending. The effect appears stronger in bad times and when the rule is enacted at the national level. The introduction of escape clauses in fiscal rules does not seem to affect the cyclical stance of public spending. The inclusion of cyclical adjustment features in spending rules yields broadly similar results. The results are mixed for cyclically-adjusted budget balance rules: enacting the latter is associated with countercyclical movements in overall spending, but with procyclical changes in investment spending. Structural factors, such as past debt, the level of development, the volatility of terms of trade, natural resources endowment, government stability, and the legal enforcement and monitoring arrangements backing the rule also influence the link between fiscal rules and countercyclicality. The results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications.

Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitude are still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature, we intend to clarify the debate. Based on data collected from 1037 regressions in 46 studies, our meta‐analysis suggests that little, if any, systematic evidence can be found in the research record that national leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be reelected. However, it is much more clear that researchers selectively report that national leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be reelected. The publication selection bias highlighted has nonetheless been reduced during the past 25 years of research. We also show that the incumbents' strategies differ depending on which tools they use. Finally, the nature and quality of political institutions appear to be the factors which most affect the political budget cycles.

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Delayed implantation can be experimentally induced in the rat by various procedures postponing the completion of the progesterone-oestrogen sequence which results in the uterine state of receptivity (Psychoyos, 1967 The endometria used for this study were taken from Wistar-strain rats ovariectomized on the 2nd day of pregnancy and treated daily with 5 mg of progesterone. On the 10th to 12th day post coitum, laparotomies were performed under ether anaesthesia and uterine samples about 5 mm in length were removed, fixed in a cold buffered solution of glutaraldehyde, separated into two halves by a longitudinal section through the mesometrial and antimesometrial poles, and then freeze dried and prepared for observation.In the samples examined, the walls of the uterine lumen were found to be entirely covered with a thick carpet of epithelial microvilli. 'Sea-anemone-like' formations occurred at frequent intervals among them. The microvilli were short and regular, occasionally fusing at their extremities. The 'sea-anemone¬ like' formations were of various sizes (5 to 12 µ) and each one appeared to consist of numerous, thin, long and regular, or flat and irregular tentacles, which were usually coiled. The tentacles were formed by and projected from a basal body.Occasionally, the tentacles appeared completely flattened, forming a circular compact mass with a hollow centre. Such 'opened' formations were found together with closed ones, so it is unlikely that the 'opening' was an artifact of the fixation. The different shapes, ranging from the closed bunch to the opened type, seemed rather to correspond to various degrees of development.These observations confirm those made using the transmission electron microscope. In rats ovariectomized early in pregnancy and treated with 137

This paper assesses the impact of different types of flexible fiscal rules on the procyclicality of fiscal policy with propensity scores-matching techniques, thus mitigating traditional selfselection problems. It finds that not all fiscal rules have the same impact: the design matters. Specifically, investment-friendly rules reduce the procyclicality of both overall and investment spending. The effect appears stronger in bad times and when the rule is enacted at the national level. The introduction of escape clauses in fiscal rules does not seem to affect the cyclical stance of public spending. The inclusion of cyclical adjustment features in spending rules yields broadly similar results. The results are mixed for cyclically-adjusted budget balance rules: enacting the latter is associated with countercyclical movements in overall spending, but with procyclical changes in investment spending. Structural factors, such as past debt, the level of development, the volatility of terms of trade, natural resources endowment, government stability, and the legal enforcement and monitoring arrangements backing the rule also influence the link between fiscal rules and countercyclicality. The results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications.