Purpose Crowdfunding offers a popular means to raise donations online from many contributors. Open calls for contributions involve another actor too, namely, the internet platform that maintains the two-sided market. This paper aims to examine the effect of this intermediary on contributors’ willingness to participate in crowdfunding projects. Design/methodology/approach An online survey measures the relative effect of contributors’ attitudes towards the crowdfunding platform on two key behaviours: willingness to share word-of-mouth and willingness to participate in a project. Findings Using the theoretical framework of a two-sided market, the empirical study reveals that attitudes towards a crowdfunding platform moderate contributors’ willingness to participate due to several risk factors that affect the platform’s perceived usefulness and ease of use. These factors have negative influences on attitude towards the platform, which reduces support for the project. The effects are stronger for willingness to participate than for word-of-mouth intentions. Research limitations/implications Declarative measures and a focus on the utilitarian dimensions of contributor participation limit the external validity of the findings. Practical implications With the results of this study, internet platforms can find ways to improve the attitudes of potential contributors. Project creators can use the findings to adapt their communication campaigns and reduce inhibitions that keep contributors from using platforms. Originality/value This study advances marketing and crowdfunding literature by highlighting the potential dark side of a platform that functions as an intermediary in a two-sided market.
Early research work confirms that the use of the new European currency, the euro, could create an effect of money illusion: expressed in euros, perceived prices seem lower and price elasticity diminished. But it also concludes on the complexity of the relationship between prices, currency unit and behavior as the money illusion effect can either increase or decrease demand for specific brands. Tests the assumption that the size of the money illusion could vary by country and is positively related to the level of the conversion rate. Applies the Gabor and Granger method to the price of an item of domestic equipment in two countries, one with a big conversion rate (Spain), and one with a small conversion rate (Germany). Observes a money illusion effect with an increase in intention to buy when the prices are expressed in euros in Germany but, as this effect is not observed in Spain, concludes that a positive relationship between money illusion and conversion rate cannot be accepted and proposes alternative hypotheses, such as the difficulty of the conversion.
Purpose -Seeks to study the effect of a low-price guarantee (PG) on store price image and store patronage intention. Two kinds of low-price guarantee are studied: a price-matching guarantee (PMG) where the price difference is refunded and a price-beating guarantee (PBG) where a retailer offers an additional compensation. Design/methodology/approach -A questionnaire is used to collect information on 180 non-student respondents in an experimental framework where low-price guarantee dimension is manipulated through three advertisements for printers. Findings -Findings are: first, that PG indeed lowers store price image, increases the confidence that the store has lower prices and increases patronage intention; second, that, compared with a PMG whose effects are positive but rather small, a PBG further lowers the store price image on the low prices dimension without increasing the intention to search for lower price, this intention being already rather high in the PMG condition; third, that a larger effect is observed for non-regular customers.Research limitations/implications -Research limitations are associated with the data collection. For greater reality the study uses an existing retail chain, so specific effects coming from this chain could influence the results but this bias cannot be evaluated as the experiment involves one retailer only. Practical implications -Practical implications are that price image can be manipulated without any change in pricing policy by a low-price guarantee and that the interest to adopt a price-beating guarantee is real. Originality/value -The contribution of this study lies in its focus on a large PBG level that retailers already apply and in demonstrating that a PG depends on the relationship between the consumer and the retailer with a stronger effect on non-regular customers.
Purpose Questionnaire measures of consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) and price sensitivity are biased, yet these declarative methods can aid managerial decision-making. Additional choices involve which question formats to use (open-ended or discrete choice) and how many questions (unique versus multiple). This paper aims to inform such choices for online data collection with an empirical evaluation of the size of the bias induced by four methods (price acceptability, price judgements, multiple discrete choices and single discrete choices) in a realistic choice context. Design/methodology/approach An experimental framework collects online data about a staple product whose price should be well known. Price sensitivity, WTP and their confidence intervals are derived from a logistic binary model of acceptability, then ranked to evaluate the size of the bias of each method, relative to an indirect benchmark. Findings Online data collections with self-administrated questionnaires lower respondents’ involvement and create substantial bias; hypothetical methods overestimate WTP and underestimate price sensitivity, especially with methods using unique questions (both discrete choice and price acceptability). Multiple questions (price judgements and repeated random discrete choices) increase attention to price information and reduce the bias. The round price effect also is notable in data collected by open-ended methods. Practical implications To measure declarative WTP and price sensitivity with online data collections, researchers should use a random discrete choices method. Price acceptability questions and split tests are not recommended. Price judgements provide reliable information about consumer reactions to prices, but the strong round price bias is problematic. Originality/value This study adds to marketing and economic literature by comparing actual measurement methods used by firms, rather than hypothetical versions, and offers strong external validity.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how offering control on data usage and offering money can increase willingness to share private information with a data broker. Design/methodology/approach Personal data are collected for internet users with a Web questionnaire. In an experimental framework, compensations control money are manipulated and consumers’ data sharing is explained by sensitivity and regulatory focus. Findings Offering control increases willingness to disclose personal data, even sensitive one, but the effect is not moderated by regulatory focus. Offering monetary compensation has a negative, but small, effect on willingness to share personal data, and the effect is moderated by regulatory focus. Originality/value Offering a large amount of money is a double-edged offer, as it creates a signal that increases potential negative effect of disclosing personal data to unknown third party.
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