The cry for land is, without any doubt, the loudest, the most dramatic and the most desperate sound in Guatemala.’ So wrote the Guatemalan bishops in 1988. In their country's long history, the bishops stated, only one president – Jacobo Arbenz – had addressed the issue of land reform.1 Inaugurated in 1951, Arbenz presided over the most successful agrarian reform in the history of Central America. The reports of the US embassy bear testimony to the fact that within eighteen months land was distributed to 100,000 peasant families, amid little violence and without adversely affecting production.2 Praise for initiating the reform does not belong, however, solely to Arbenz. As his wife observed, ‘Alone, he could not have done it’. Praise should also be given to the Communist party of Guatemala, whose leaders were Arbenz's closest personal and political friends.3

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Drawing on thousands of pages of documents from the closed Cuban archives, from U.S. archives, and from the former East German archives, as well as published materials, this article explores the role that Cuba played in Africa after its dramatic dispatch of 36,000 soldiers to Angola in late 1975 and the first few months of 1976. The article focuses on the two most important aspects of Cuba's policy in Africa after 1976: its intervention in Ethiopia in 1977–1978 and its continuing presence in Angola, a presence that continued until 1991. The article analyzes Cuba's motivations, the extent to which Fidel Castro's policy was a function of Soviet demands, and the effect of Cuba's policy in Africa on relations with the United States. The concluding section offers an assessment of the costs and benefits of Cuba's policy in Africa.

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A comprehensive study of the available documents about the Bay of Pigs, including many that have been declassified within the last eighteen months, and extensive interviews with the protagonists in the CIA, the White House and the State Department lead me to conclude that the disastrous operation was launched not simply because Kennedy was poorly served by his young staff and was the captive of his campaign rhetoric, nor simply because of the hubris of the CIA. Rather, the Bay of Pigs was approved because the CIA and the White House assumed they were speaking the same language when, in fact, they were speaking in utterly different tongues.