This study examines whether auditor opinions are affected by political and economic influences from governments. We use auditor locality (local versus non-local) to capture such influences from local governments in China. Based on data from China's stock markets for the period 1996-2002, we find that local auditors, who have greater economic dependence on local clients and are subject to more political influence from local governments than non-local auditors, are inclined to report favorably on local governmentowned companies to mitigate probable economic losses. Moreover, companies with qualified opinions are more likely to switch from a non-local auditor to a local auditor than companies with unqualified opinions. Contrary to some prior studies, we find that in China's political environment, local government-owned companies that switched from a non-local auditor to a local auditor after receiving a qualified opinion can succeed in opinion shopping.
We investigate whether a departure from a tax-based accounting system toward the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards encourages tax noncompliance. We also examine whether such a departure, which weakens book-tax conformity, affects the informativeness of book-tax differences for tax noncompliance. Our evidence suggests that as book-tax conformity decreases, tax noncompliance increases. Although book-tax differences remain informative of tax noncompliance, the informativeness attenuates as book-tax conformity weakens. Additionally, firms with high incentives to inflate book income are more tax compliant than their counterparts after the departure from a tax-based accounting system
This study investigates how government ownership and corporate governance influence a firm's tax aggressiveness. Using Chinese listed companies during 2003-2009, we find that compared with government-controlled firms, nongovernment-controlled firms pursue a more aggressive tax strategy. In particular, non-government-controlled firms with a higher percentage of the board shareholdings and with a CEO who also serves as the board chairman are more aggressive. For government-controlled firms, we find that board shareholding has an impact on tax aggressiveness and it does not differ between local and central government-controlled firms. However, local government-controlled firms in less developed regions where the implementation of corporate governance measures is generally less effective are more tax aggressive than those in other regions.
Taking advantage of the agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and the weak corporate governance in a transition economy, we investigate the relationship between tax avoidance (proxied by effective tax rates) and tunneling (proxied by related-party lending) from a principal-principal agency perspective. We find that corporate tax avoidance is positively associated with tunneling after controlling for firm characteristics, corporate governance, and institutional factors that affect tunneling. This relationship is more pronounced for firms with cash shortages and in periods with relatively weak investor protection. In addition, the value-enhancing implications of tax avoidance are reduced for firms in which tax avoidance is highly correlated with tunneling. By demonstrating the existence of tunneling-related tax avoidance and its economic consequences, this study sheds light on the emerging agency perspective on tax avoidance.
JEL Classifications: G18; H20; M41.
Local governments play dual, but conflicting, roles in China's tax system. That is, they are both tax collectors and controlling shareholders of firms subject to tax payments. We investigate how local governments balance their tax collection and tax avoidance incentives. We find that the conflicts between central and local governments arising from the 2002 tax sharing reform have led to more tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms, particularly when the local government's ownership percentage of the firms is higher than the tax sharing ratio. We also find evidence that the overall level of tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms in a region is positively associated with local fiscal deficits. As a high level of government ownership of corporations and intergovernmental tax sharing are common phenomena in many transitional economies, this study offers valuable insights into how the dual roles played by local governments affect tax policy enforcement in these economies.
JEL Classifications: H26; H71; M40; G38.
The rising tide of corporate scandals and audit failures has shocked the public, and the integrity of auditors is being increasingly questioned. It is crucial for auditors and regulators to understand the main causes of audit failure and devise preventive measures accordingly. This study analyzes enforcement actions issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission against auditors in respect of fraudulent financial reporting committed by listed companies in China. We find that auditors are more likely to be sanctioned by the regulators for failing to detect and report material misstatement frauds rather than disclosure frauds. Further analysis of the material misstatements indicates that auditors are more likely to be sanctioned for failing to detect and report revenue-related frauds rather than assets-related frauds. In sum, our results suggest that regulators believe auditors have the responsibility to detect and report frauds that are egregious, transaction-based, and related to accounting earnings. The results contribute to our knowledge of auditors' responsibilities for detecting frauds as perceived by regulators.
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