2006
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-006-6394-z
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A Political–economic Analysis of Auditor Reporting and Auditor Switches

Abstract: This study examines whether auditor opinions are affected by political and economic influences from governments. We use auditor locality (local versus non-local) to capture such influences from local governments in China. Based on data from China's stock markets for the period 1996-2002, we find that local auditors, who have greater economic dependence on local clients and are subject to more political influence from local governments than non-local auditors, are inclined to report favorably on local governmen… Show more

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Cited by 249 publications
(215 citation statements)
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References 30 publications
(46 reference statements)
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“…Moreover, the coefficient associated with the liquid variable is negative of -0.35 and significant with the threshold of 5% with (P = 0,027) This result is coherent with the results of the studies (Yoke-Kai Chan andTerry S. Walter 1996 andNelson et al in 1988) which showed that the efforts of the auditor increase with the increase in the level of risk and decreases in the least risky companies with strong liquidities that can incite the auditors to certify their opinions without reservations and consequently positively influence the probability of having an audit opinion with reservations.…”
Section: Liquiditysupporting
confidence: 89%
“…Moreover, the coefficient associated with the liquid variable is negative of -0.35 and significant with the threshold of 5% with (P = 0,027) This result is coherent with the results of the studies (Yoke-Kai Chan andTerry S. Walter 1996 andNelson et al in 1988) which showed that the efforts of the auditor increase with the increase in the level of risk and decreases in the least risky companies with strong liquidities that can incite the auditors to certify their opinions without reservations and consequently positively influence the probability of having an audit opinion with reservations.…”
Section: Liquiditysupporting
confidence: 89%
“…In addition, firms can manage audit opinions by choosing auditors who are more inclined to issue favorable reports, such as switching from large, nonlocal auditors to small, local auditors that are more susceptible to the firms' influence when they receive modified audit opinions (Chan, Lin, & Mo, 2006;DeFond et al, 2000;Lin & Liu, 2009). These findings suggest that credit rating and auditing alone are not adequate to make firms become more investor friendly without the support of other external and internal governance mechanisms.…”
Section: External Mechanism: Market Forcesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Owing to the present regulatory profit requirement for additional capital rising by listed companies, government owners have strong motivations to force managers to display positive earnings with little concern for audit quality (Chan et al, 2006). Additionally, contrary to other group of investors, the government holds sufficient power over the public in terms of whatever information is required from the listed companies.…”
Section: Logistic Regression Analysis Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%