Energy conservation and emission reduction are important for all countries, and the problem of high energy consumption in scenic spots is increasingly prominent. Contract energy management (EPC) can effectively make up for the lack of energy-saving technology and experience for scenic spots. Based on the benefit sharing contract mode of energy conservation, this paper establishes two-stage Stackelberg game models between the scenic spot as energy user (EU) and the energy service company (ESCO), and analyses the allocation of energy conservation subsidies in EPC projects. The study found some conclusions. First, when the energy saving of an EPC project reaches the subsidy standard and the EU gains all energy saving subsidies, the ESCO will not sign an energy saving revenue sharing EPC project contract with the EU. Second, compared with other subsidy allocation scenarios, the optimal energy saving income sharing ratio of the EU is the highest when the energy saving of EPC projects reaches the subsidy standard and all the energy saving subsidies are allocated to the ESCO. Third, when the unit energy saving subsidy is high, in the cases that the energy saving subsidy standard is met and the energy saving subsidy is shared by the ESCO and the EU or the energy saving subsidy is fully allocated to the ESCO, the optimal energy saving is higher than the optimal energy saving when the EPC project does not meet the energy saving subsidy standard. Finally, whether the energy saving subsidy policy can encourage the ESCO depends on the energy saving standard and subsidy amount set by the government. When the subsidy for energy conservation is relatively high, the subsidy policy can effectively encourage the ESCO to save energy.
Considering power-sale-side reform and carbon trading, we studies the pricing and emission reduction game between a power plant and a manufacturer. We investigates the optimal emission reduction, retail price and the optimal electricity price with and without power-sale-side reform, and analyzes the influence of electricity price, the carbon trading price, abatement cost coefficient and other factors on the decision-making of the power plant and manufacturer. We find that with the power-sale-side reform liberalized the electricity price, the emission reduction decision of power plant is independent of the carbon trading regulation of different entities; when the electricity price is low, carbon trading regulation will incentive the power plant to improve emission reduction; regardless of the carbon trading regulation is implemented for the manufacturer and the power plant, the retail price of the product decreases (increases) as the electricity price increases, but when the manufacturer is regulated by carbon trading regulation, the retail price decreases as the emission reduction amount of the power plant increases; without power-sale-side reform, if the price of carbon trading rises, power plant will certainly increase emission reductions; with the power-sale-side reform, only under certain conditions, the emission reductions of power plant will increase with the increase in carbon trading prices.
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