Game-theoretic Research of a Power Plant and a Manufacturer Considering New Energy Consumption

Abstract

Considering power-sale-side reform and carbon trading, we studies the pricing and emission reduction game between a power plant and a manufacturer. We investigates the optimal emission reduction, retail price and the optimal electricity price with and without power-sale-side reform, and analyzes the influence of electricity price, the carbon trading price, abatement cost coefficient and other factors on the decision-making of the power plant and manufacturer. We find that with the power-sale-side reform liberalized the electricity price, the emission reduction decision of power plant is independent of the carbon trading regulation of different entities; when the electricity price is low, carbon trading regulation will incentive the power plant to improve emission reduction; regardless of the carbon trading regulation is implemented for the manufacturer and the power plant, the retail price of the product decreases (increases) as the electricity price increases, but when the manufacturer is regulated by carbon trading regulation, the retail price decreases as the emission reduction amount of the power plant increases; without power-sale-side reform, if the price of carbon trading rises, power plant will certainly increase emission reductions; with the power-sale-side reform, only under certain conditions, the emission reductions of power plant will increase with the increase in carbon trading prices.