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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze, for both parties of a distribution channel, to what extent each party perceives the counterpart’s use of performance measurement systems (PMS) and how this perception affects the perceiver’s own use of these systems, for either decision control or decision management. Design/methodology/approach The paper proposes a conceptual model tested at different levels using structural equations models. A case study uses survey data from 107 distributors and 91 manufacturer managers. Findings PMS allow evaluation by the manufacturer and daily management by distributors; both uses of PMS can be simultaneous and complementary. Results show that each party’s perception of the counterpart’s use contributes to its own use, although real uses do not significantly influence these perceptions. Research limitations/implications The results must be interpreted with caution because the sample is small. This study calls for further data collection in real situations with larger samples, and for eliminating the influence of the distribution channel type. Further work is needed to analyze other constructs driving the relationship between real use and perception. Originality/value This study’s originality comes from the conceptual model, data set, and levels of analysis. Decoupling real use and perception, it challenges the prevailing assumption that managers accurately perceive counterpart managers’ use of PMS. Analyzing at both group and individual levels, it extends the more usual dyadic studies by recognizing that any given manager’s perception may be almost wholly formed by his/her interaction with a group of individuals.

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External managers may be key to setting up and managing multi-partner alliances (MPAs) among small firms, but their role has not yet been integrated in previous literature on risk and governance structures. This longitudinal matched-pair case study investigates the dynamics between relational and performance risks and control-based and trust-based governance mechanisms, in MPAs promoted and managed by external managers. The integration of external managers allows the identification of different levels of trust and control among partners. This is also the case between such partners and the external manager who controls/trusts, who is controlled/trusted, and how this changes over time. Our results show that trust and control are influenced by both the external actor and partner’s risk perceptions; they also complement each other to manage high performance and relational risks in a dynamic process. We extend prior knowledge by showing that the analysis of control/trust complementarity must take into consideration both partner-partner and partner-manager relationships.