We propose a measure of systemic risk, Δ CoVaR, defined as the change in the value at risk of the financial system conditional on an institution being under distress relative to its median state. Our estimates show that characteristics such as leverage, size, maturity mismatch, and asset price booms significantly predict Δ CoVaR. We also provide out-of-sample forecasts of a countercyclical, forwardlooking measure of systemic risk, and show that the 2006:IV value of this measure would have predicted more than one-third of realized Δ CoVaR during the

We propose a measure for systemic risk: CoVaR, the value at risk (VaR) of the financial system conditional on institutions being under distress. We define an institution's contribution to systemic risk as the difference between CoVaR conditional on the institution being under distress and the CoVaR in the median state of the institution. From our estimates of CoVaR for the universe of publicly traded financial institutions, we quantify the extent to which characteristics such as leverage, size, and maturity mismatch predict systemic risk contribution. We also provide out of sample forecasts of a countercyclical, forward looking measure of systemic risk and show that the 2006Q4 value of this measure would have predicted more than half of realized covariances during the financial crisis.

No abstract

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the authors and are published to elicit comments and to further debate.Bank profits are high in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) compared to other regions. This paper uses a sample of 389 banks in 41 SSA countries to study the determinants of bank profitability. We find that apart from credit risk, higher returns on assets are associated with larger bank size, activity diversification, and private ownership. Bank returns are affected by macroeconomic variables, suggesting that macroeconomic policies that promote low inflation and stable output growth does boost credit expansion. The results also indicate moderate persistence in profitability. Causation in the Granger sense from returns on assets to capital occurs with a considerable lag, implying that high returns are not immediately retained in the form of equity increases. Thus, the paper gives some support to a policy of imposing higher capital requirements in the region in order to strengthen financial stability.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe show how to price the time series and cross section of zero coupon bonds via ordinary least squares regressions. Our approach allows computationally fast estimation of term structure models with a large number of pricing factors. Even though we do not impose cross-equation restrictions in the estimation, we show that our return regressions generate a term structure of interest rates with small pricing errors compared to commonly reported specifications, both in and out-of-sample.

We reconsider the role of nancial intermediaries in monetary economics. We explore the hypothesis that the nancial intermediary sector is the engine that drives the nancial cycle through the uctuations in the price of risk. In this framework, balance sheet quantities emerge as a key indicator of risk appetite and hence for the \risk-taking channel" of monetary policy. We document evidence that balance sheets of nancial intermediaries provide a window on the transmission of monetary policy through capital market conditions. Short-term interest rates are found to be important in in uencing the size of nancial intermediary balance sheets. Our ndings suggest that the traditional focus on the money stock for the conduct of monetary policy may have more modern counterparts, and suggest the importance of tracking balance sheet quantities for the conduct of monetary policy.

No abstract

The availability of credit varies over the business cycle through shifts in the leverage of financial intermediaries. Empirically, we find that intermediary leverage is negatively aligned with the banks' value-at-risk (VaR). Motivated by the evidence, we explore a contracting model that captures the observed features. Under general conditions on the outcome distribution given by Extreme Value Theory (EVT), intermediaries maintain a constant probability of default to shifts in the outcome distribution, implying substantial deleveraging during downturns. For some parameter values, we can solve the model explicitly, thereby endogenizing the VaR threshold probability from the contracting problem.JEL classification: G21, G32