T here are two broad categories of risk affecting supply chain design and management: (1) risks arising from the problems of coordinating supply and demand, and (2) risks arising from disruptions to normal activities. This paper is concerned with the second category of risks, which may arise from natural disasters, from strikes and economic disruptions, and from acts of purposeful agents, including terrorists. The paper provides a conceptual framework that reflects the joint activities of risk assessment and risk mitigation that are fundamental to disruption risk management in supply chains. We then consider empirical results from a rich data set covering the period 1995-2000 on accidents in the U.S. Chemical Industry. Based on these results and other literature, we discuss the implications for the design of management systems intended to cope with supply chain disruption risks.

Operations management researchers and practitioners face new challenges in integrating issues of sustainability with their traditional areas of interest. During the past 20 years, there has been growing pressure on businesses to pay more attention to the environmental and resource consequences of the products and services they offer and the processes they deploy. One symptom of this pressure is the movement towards triple bottom line reporting (3BL) concerning the relationship of profit, people, and the planet. The resulting challenges include integrating environmental, health, and safety concerns with green‐product design, lean and green operations, and closed‐loop supply chains. We review these and other “sustainability” themes covered in the first 50 issues of Production and Operations Management and conclude with some thoughts on future research challenges in sustainable operations management.

This article provides a systematic framework for the analysis and improvement of near-miss programs in the chemical process industries. Near-miss programs improve corporate environmental, health, and safety (EHS) performance through the identification and management of near misses. Based on more than 100 interviews at 20 chemical and pharmaceutical facilities, a seven-stage framework has been developed and is presented herein. The framework enables sites to analyze their own near-miss programs, identify weak management links, and implement systemwide improvements.

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This paper considers the problem of disruption risk management in global supply chains. We consider a supply chain with two participants, who face interdependent losses resulting from supply chain disruptions such as terrorist strikes and natural hazards. The Harsanyi–Selten–Nash bargaining framework is used to model the supply chain participants' choice of risk mitigation investments. The bargaining approach allows a framing of both joint financing of mitigation activities before the fact and loss‐sharing net of insurance payouts after the fact. The disagreement outcome in the bargaining game is assumed to be the result of the corresponding non‐cooperative game. We describe an incentive‐compatible contract that leads to First Best investment and equal “gain” for all players, when the solution is “interior” (as it almost certainly is in practice). A supplier that has superior security practices (i.e., is inherently safer) exploits its informational advantage by extracting an “information rent” in the usual spirit of incomplete information games. We also identify a special case of this contract, which is robust to moral hazard. The role of auditing in reinforcing investment incentives is also examined.

We study the impact of emissions tax and emissions cap-and-trade regulation on a firm's technology choice and capacity decisions. We show that emissions price uncertainty under cap-and-trade results in greater expected profit than a constant emissions price under an emissions tax, which contradicts popular arguments that the greater uncertainty under cap-and-trade will erode value. We further show that two operational drivers underlie this result: i) the firm's option not to operate, which effectively right-censors the uncertain emissions price; and ii) dispatch flexibility, which is the firm's ability to first deploy its most profitable capacity given the realized emissions price. In addition to these managerial insights, we also explore policy implications: the effect of emissions price level, and the effect of investment and production subsidies.Through an illustrative example, we show that production subsidies of higher investment and production cost technologies (such as carbon capture and storage technologies) have no effect on the firm's optimal total capacity when firms own a portfolio of both clean and dirty technologies, but that investment subsidies of these technologies increase the firm's total capacity, conditionally increasing expected emissions. A subsidy of a lower production cost technology, on the other hand, has no effect on the firm's optimal total capacity in multi-technology portfolios, regardless of whether the subsidy is a production or investment subsidy.

T his paper develops a framework for analyzing business-to-business (B2B) transactions and supply chain management based on integrating contract procurement markets with spot markets using capacity options and forwards. The framework is motivated by the emergence of B2B exchanges in several industrial sectors to facilitate such integrated contract and spot procurement. In the framework developed, a buyer and multiple sellers may either contract for delivery in advance (the "contracting" option) or they may buy and sell some or all of their input/output in a spot market. Contract pricing involves both a reservation fee per unit of capacity and an execution fee per unit of output if capacity is called. The key question addressed is the structure of the optimal portfolios of contracting and spot market transactions for the buyer and these sellers, and the pricing thereof in market equilibrium. Existence and structure of market equilibria are characterized for the associated competitive game between sellers with heterogeneous technologies, under the assumption that they know the buyer's demand function. This allows an explicit characterization of the price of capacity options and the value of managerial flexibility, as well as providing conditions under which B2B exchanges are efficient and sustainable.

T his paper surveys the underlying theory and practice in the use of options in support of emerging business-to-business (B2B) markets. Such options, on both capacity and output, play an important role in integrating long-and short-term contracting between multiple buyers and sellers in such markets. This trend is especially important in capital-intensive industries, where improvements in fine tuning the coordination of supply and demand carry large economic benefits. Typically, such options are benchmarked (or defined) on the basis of spot market information conveyed through near real-time B2B transactions. This paper notes a broad set of goods and services currently being traded in both B2B short-run markets and long-term contract markets, and reviews economic and managerial frameworks that have been proposed to explain the structure of contracting in these markets. We provide a general framework based on transactions cost economics, and we use this framework to provide a review and synthesis of existing literature to explain various types of contracting linked to B2B exchanges in capital-intensive industries. The paper concludes with a discussion of implementation challenges and open research questions.