The aim of this paper is to highlight empirically some important worldwide differences in the impact of privatization of the fixed-line telecommunications operator on network expansion, tariffs, and efficiency during the 1985-2007 period for a large panel of countries. Our work suggests that the divergent results in the empirical literature on the performance of the privatization reform can be explained to a large extent by cross-regional heterogeneity. We find that the impact of privatization on outcomes is significantly positive in OECD and African resource scarce coastal countries, weakly positive in Latin American and the Caribbean countries, and strongly negative in African resource rich and African resource scarce landlocked countries. The results presented in this paper thus challenge the idea that there is a unique model of reform for infrastructure sectors that is equally applicable across regions and countries. JEL-codes: L51,

This paper discusses the relationship between the quality of political and economic institutions and the performance of the infrastructure industries reform process in developing countries. Our point of departure is that, when thinking about this relationship, it is necessary to take into account the specific features of these countries' economies Recuero Virto, 2005, Laffont, 2005). Based on two econometric analysis of time-series-crosssectional data on the telecommunications sector, we present the empirical findings and policy implications pertaining two issues (Gasmi et al., 2006, Gasmi andRecuero Virto, 2007). The first issue concerns the impact of the quality of institutions on the performance of regulation. Our review points to the fact that political accountability of institutional systems is a key determinant of regulatory performance. The second issue relates to the factors that shape the sectorial reforms themselves and the impact on these reforms on the development of the industry. Our main conclusion is that countries' institutional risk and financial constraints are among the major factors that explain which reforms are actually implemented. JEL-codes: L51, H11, L96, L97, C23

The relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation has recently assumed greater prominence in the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor linking political and regulatory structures and processes, this article empirically investigates its impact on the performance of regulation in telecommunications in time-series-cross-sectional data sets for 29 developing countries and 23 developed countries during 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well-documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the article provides empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis finds that the impact of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.

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