The relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation has recently assumed greater prominence in the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor linking political and regulatory structures and processes, this article empirically investigates its impact on the performance of regulation in telecommunications in time-series-cross-sectional data sets for 29 developing countries and 23 developed countries during 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well-documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the article provides empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis finds that the impact of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.

This is an open access article under the terms of the Creat ive Commo ns Attri bution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Abstract 1. Climate change is impacting marine ecosystems and their goods and services in diverse ways, which can directly hinder our ability to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), set out under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.2. Through expert elicitation and a literature review, we find that most climate change effects have a wide variety of negative consequences across marine ecosystem services, though most studies have highlighted impacts from warming and consequences of marine species.3. Climate change is expected to negatively influence marine ecosystem services through global stressors-such as ocean warming and acidification-but also by amplifying local and regional stressors such as freshwater runoff and pollution load. Experts indicated that all SDGs would be overwhelmingly negatively affectedby these climate impacts on marine ecosystem services, with eliminating hunger being among the most directly negatively affected SDG. 5. Despite these challenges, the SDGs aiming to transform our consumption and production practices and develop clean energy systems are found to be least affected by marine climate impacts. These findings represent a strategic point of K E Y W O R D S climate change, expert elicitation, marine ecosystem services, ocean sustainability, Sustainable Development Goals

No abstract

The aim of this paper is to highlight empirically some important worldwide differences in the impact of privatization of the fixed-line telecommunications operator on network expansion, tariffs, and efficiency during the 1985-2007 period for a large panel of countries. Our work suggests that the divergent results in the empirical literature on the performance of the privatization reform can be explained to a large extent by cross-regional heterogeneity. We find that the impact of privatization on outcomes is significantly positive in OECD and African resource scarce coastal countries, weakly positive in Latin American and the Caribbean countries, and strongly negative in African resource rich and African resource scarce landlocked countries. The results presented in this paper thus challenge the idea that there is a unique model of reform for infrastructure sectors that is equally applicable across regions and countries. JEL-codes: L51,

This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous investigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 time-series-cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determinants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant. JEL codes: C23, L51, L96, L98.

The initiatives in natural capital accounting have multiplied in the recent years, particularly concerning ecosystem accounts. Yet, natural capital accounting has been rarely used to inform public policy decisions. Based on a survey for statistical offices and ministries and independent experts worldwide, we confirm that there is very little use of natural capital accounts for public policy decisions and, more so, in developing countries. The most relevant obstacles are the lack of political support by key people and institutional leadership unable to promote policy use by other ministries. Concerning developing countries, the factor which is considered as the most relevant in preventing the use of natural capital accounts for policy making is the stage of development of the country. In addition, respondents from statistical institutes and developing countries are particularly concerned about institutional obstacles and, to a lesser extent, data availability and cooperation. Respondents from ministries and independent experts are particularly concerned about design obstacles. A key result of the survey is the need to evaluate the value-added of natural capital accounts with respect to statistics. Most probably, natural capital accounts will only be integrated in national accounts in the aftermath of a major environmental disaster.

In a dataset on 83 countries covering the years 1960 through 2009, we find a negative indirect effect of the share of renewable natural capital in wealth on economic growth transmitted through demographic factors, more specifically, population fertility. In contrast, in countries with lower income inequality and higher institutional quality, the share of non-renewable natural capital in wealth has a direct positive impact on growth. We also find that countries with higher income per capita, human development, and institutional quality have a higher share of renewable natural capital per capita, but a lower share of renewable natural capital in wealth. Renewable natural capital is thus valuable for the population and of primary concern for empowered countries, even though it contributes less to wealth and economic growth. Our results raise serious questions about the way wealth and growth are defined in economics when one investigates the impact of natural capital and point to the importance of preserving natural capital, particularly, in less developed countries.

This paper discusses the relationship between the quality of political and economic institutions and the performance of the infrastructure industries reform process in developing countries. Our point of departure is that, when thinking about this relationship, it is necessary to take into account the specific features of these countries' economies Recuero Virto, 2005, Laffont, 2005). Based on two econometric analysis of time-series-crosssectional data on the telecommunications sector, we present the empirical findings and policy implications pertaining two issues (Gasmi et al., 2006, Gasmi andRecuero Virto, 2007). The first issue concerns the impact of the quality of institutions on the performance of regulation. Our review points to the fact that political accountability of institutional systems is a key determinant of regulatory performance. The second issue relates to the factors that shape the sectorial reforms themselves and the impact on these reforms on the development of the industry. Our main conclusion is that countries' institutional risk and financial constraints are among the major factors that explain which reforms are actually implemented. JEL-codes: L51, H11, L96, L97, C23