Porter's (1985) analysis of competitive strategy is used to explain industry specialization by Big 6 accounting firms. In Porter's framework, industry specialization can be viewed as a differentiation strategy whose purpose is to create a sustainable competitive advantage relative to nonspecialist auditors. A differentiation strategy will lead to higher audit fees if valued by clients. We find evidence of higher fees for Big 6 industry specialists relative to nonspecialists in the U.S. audit market, but only for companies in the lower half of the sample based on size (assets <$123 million). By contrast, companies in the upper half of the sample do not pay a specialist premium, and audit fees actually decrease as a company becomes increasingly large relative to its auditor's industry clientele. Together these results suggest that audit fees are higher when clients are small and have little bargaining power, but audit fees are lower when clients have greater bargaining power and this is more likely when companies are large in absolute size and large relative to their auditor's industry clientele.

This paper examines the role of auditee profitability in pricing new audit engagements. Changes in the auditing environment are noted that suggest that auditors are managing their practices differently than they did in prior years. Audit fees are examined to answer two questions: (1) whether CPA firms still discount fees for new engagements in the current audit environment; (2) whether such fee discounts are dependent upon auditee profitability. The results suggest that auditors still discount new engagements in the 1990s, but that they are less willing to offer discounts when auditees show losses in the year prior to the new audit engagement. Further, this result is stronger for companies that switch from non-Big 6 firms to Big 6 firms than it is for intra-Big 6 switches. These findings suggest that auditors are managing their exposure to audit risk by adjusting audit fees.

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Many observers are dissatisfied with the accounting profession's ability to warn the public of upcoming bankruptcy filings. Since regulators and users tend to treat an unmodified audit opinion as a "clean bill of health," they do not expect the business to fail in the near future. Research has shown that more often than not, auditors end up letting users down when it comes to predicting bankruptcy filings with audit opinions.Although auditors assert they are not responsible for predicting future events, it is very clear that their opinion decision is evaluated, at least in part, based on events that occur after the audit report date. The interesting and logical next step is to find out how companies exit bankruptcy. Do they liquidate or reorganize? Successful reorganization may, in the end, exonerate auditors and preserve their role as an early warning device. The opinion prediction model developed in the paper introduces a new bankruptcy resolution variable that proxies for the auditor's prognosis of the ultimate disposition of the soon-to-be-bankrupt company. Using a sample of bankruptcy filings between 1982 and 1992, we find that auditors do not seem to be able to predict filings or resolution. Our tests of bankruptcy resolution support what auditors have been arguing for years: that they are not clairvoyant with respect to a client's future. for their useful comments. Our paper also benefited from a workshop at the University of Miami. 507 508Modeling the Audit Opinions Issued to Bankrupt Companies

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