During a 19-month period from April 1993 to October 1994, 41 isolates of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VREF) were detected in seven different hospitals in a city in southern Texas. A case-control study to determine the risk factors for acquisition was done in the hospital in which the majority of isolates were detected. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) of whole-cell DNA was used to determine strain identity. Thirty-five (85%) of the 41 VREF isolates were of the vanB phenotype. Of these, 32 (91%) of 35 were the same strain by PFGE typing. The same vanB strain was documented in five different hospitals in the city. In contrast, 4 (67%) of 6 of the vanA phenotype VREF isolates were distinct strains by PFGE typing. Significant risk factors for colonization or infection with VREF were prior exposure to antibiotics (P = .04), the previous use of third-generation cephalosporins (P = .03), and the previous use of parenteral vancomycin (P = .002). Infection-control and antibiotic-utilization measures were implemented to control cross-transmission and selection of VREF isolates. During the emergence of VREF in our city, clonal dissemination of a single strain of vanB VREF among six hospitals was documented. Limited cross-transmission of vanA phenotype VREF isolates occurred, but most vanA VREF isolates were distinct strains selected in individual hospital environments.

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Background The use of electronic surveillance systems (ESSs) is gradually increasing in infection prevention and control programs. Little is known about the characteristics of hospitals that have a ESS, user satisfaction with ESSs, and organizational support for implementation of ESSs. Methods A total of 350 acute care hospitals in California were invited to participate in a Web-based survey; 207 hospitals (59%) agreed to participate. The survey included a description of infection prevention and control department staff, where and how they spent their time, a measure of organizational support for infection prevention and control, and reported experience with ESSs. Results Only 23% (44/192) of responding infection prevention and control departments had an ESS. No statistically significant difference was seen in how and where infection preventionists (IPs) who used an ESS and those who did not spend their time. The 2 significant predictors of whether an ESS was present were score on the Organizational Support Scale (odds ratio [OR], 1.10; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.02-1.18) and hospital bed size (OR, 1.004; 95% CI, 1.00-1.007). Organizational support also was positively correlated with IP satisfaction with the ESS, as measured on the Computer Usability Scale (P = .02). Conclusion Despite evidence that such systems may improve efficiency of data collection and potentially improve patient outcomes, ESSs remain relatively uncommon in infection prevention and control programs. Based on our findings, organizational support appears to be a major predictor of the presence, use, and satisfaction with ESSs in infection prevention and control programs.

Three attributes were identified: sensory deprivation, social isolation, and confinement. Antecedents included individual perception and situational dimensions. Consequences included anxiety, depression, mood disturbances, anger, loneliness, and adverse health events. Through this concept analysis, isolation has been theoretically defined as a state in which an individual experiences a reduction in the level of normal sensory and social input with possible involuntary limitations on physical space or movement. Systematic studies of isolation using this concept can ultimately enhance nurses' knowledge base and contribute to the quality of life for isolated persons.

Guidelines for managing multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) in health care settings were published by the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) in October 2006. These guidelines outline appropriate strategies to help prevent MDRO cross transmission. Perioperative nurses should be prepared to implement these strategies in an effort to protect their surgical patients from contracting MDRO infections. The HICPAC recommends elevating contact precautions to "intensified interventions" in facilities with endemic outbreaks of MDROs. Perioperative nurses should participate in these efforts by adhering to infection control practices, championing these practices with other health care personnel, and providing clinical support and leadership.

ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT01052545.

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