Infrastructure and technology investments that increase water-use efficiency (also called modernization investments) have become one of the most preferred solutions to cope with water scarcity in the context of climate change, increase productivity to satisfy growing demand, and save water to maintain ecosystems. In many cases, however, the higher efficiencies have led to more, instead of less, water consumption. This is generally known as the efficiency paradox or rebound effect. Understanding the processes behind the efficiency paradox remains a difficult task, given the variety of variables that either directly or indirectly factor into farmers’ water-use decisions and the strategic nature of many of those. This is even more the case when water is managed collectively by water-user associations, as in many irrigation systems worldwide. In order to better understand this complexity, our study applies the Networks of Action Situations approach to 37 studies of irrigation modernization investments in collectively managed irrigation systems. Through a systematic case review method, we identify 12 different action situations and 192 institutional, physical, and informational linkages that connect them. Although some studies report linkages between the modernization-investment and water-saving decision situations, many others relate them to situations typically associated with the collective management of irrigation systems (like the water application or infrastructure maintenance situations). A number of these situations, also including the water-saving situation, involve collective action problems that need to be integrated in current analyses. The solution towards more water saving may indeed benefit from a more active involvement of irrigation associations, given their proven capacity to promote collective action among farmers vis-à-vis other irrigation management situations.
We study costly communication in a common-pool resource (CPR) experiment as a proxy for two different forms of participatory processes: as a public good and as a club good. A public communication meeting, representing centralized participatory processes, occurs when all group members’ monetary contributions reach a specified threshold. Club communication meetings, representing networked participatory processes, follow only among those members of the group who pay a communication fee. We test whether the way costly communication is provided affects the willingness of participants to contribute to communication, as well as the dynamics of such payments, and the content of communication. This is done by analyzing contributions to communication and communication content of 100 real-life resource users participating in a lab-in-field experiment. We find that contributions towards communication are higher when communication is public, and that club communication features more frequent but less inclusive communication meetings. Also, communication content is more oriented towards addressing the collective action problem associated with the management of the resource when communication groups are attended by all participants. The identified differences between the two ways to provide for communication can inform policies and the design of participatory processes in natural resource governance.
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