This paper uses the complete property and casualty insurance files of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners from 1984-1991 to assess the effect of medical malpractice reforms pertaining to damages levels and the degree to which these damages are insurable. Limits on noneconomic damages were most influential in affecting insurance market outcomes. Several punitive damages variables specifically affected the medical malpractice insurance market, including limits on punitive damage levels, prohibitions of the insurability of punitive damages, and prohibition of punitive damages awards. Estimates for insurance losses, premiums, and loss ratios indicate effects of reform in the expected directions, where the greatest constraining effects were for losses.The quantile regression analysis of losses indicates that punitive damages reforms and limits were most consequential for firms at the high end of the loss spectrum. Tort reforms also enhanced insurer profitability during this time period.

This paper uses the complete property and casualty insurance files of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners from 1984-1991 to assess the effect of medical malpractice reforms pertaining to damages levels and the degree to which these damages are insurable. Limits on noneconomic damages were most influential in affecting insurance market outcomes. Several punitive damages variables specifically affected the medical malpractice insurance market, including limits on punitive damage levels, prohibitions of the insurability of punitive damages, and prohibition of punitive damages awards. Estimates for insurance losses, premiums, and loss ratios indicate effects of reform in the expected directions, where the greatest constraining effects were for losses.The quantile regression analysis of losses indicates that punitive damages reforms and limits were most consequential for firms at the high end of the loss spectrum. Tort reforms also enhanced insurer profitability during this time period.

Whereas the literature evaluating the effect of tort reforms has focused on reported incurred losses, this paper examines the long run effects using a comprehensive sample by state of individual firms writing medical malpractice insurance from 1984-2003. The long run effects of reforms are greater than insurers' expected effects, as five year developed losses and ten year developed losses are below the initially reported incurred losses for those years following reform measures. The quantile regressions show the greatest effects of joint and several liability limits, noneconomic damages caps, and punitive damages reforms for the firms that are at the high end of the loss distribution. These quantile regression results show stronger, more concentrated effects of the reforms than do the OLS and fixed effects estimates for the entire sample.

Natural disasters often have catastrophic risks on insurance companies as well as on the insured. Using a very large dataset on homeowners' insurance coverage by state, by firm, and by year for the 1984 to 2004 period, this paper documents the positive effect on losses and loss ratios of both unexpected catastrophes as well as large events that the authors term "blockbuster catastrophes." Insurers adapt to these catastrophic risks by raising insurance rates, leading to lower loss ratios after the catastrophic event. There is a widespread event of unexpected catastrophes and blockbuster catastrophes that reduces total premiums earned in the state, reduces the total number writing insurance coverage in the state, and leads to the exit of firms from the state. Firms with low levels of homeowners' premiums are most adversely affected by the catastrophes.

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In this article, we identify the main factors that drive insurers’ willingness to offer coverage in catastrophe‐prone property insurance lines. We compare insurers’ supply decisions in personal and commercial lines, with an emphasis on insurers’ responses in the aftermath of natural disasters. Our empirical results suggest important policy implications with regard to improving the availability of insurance against catastrophic threats. Concerning the impact of regulatory constraints, we present empirical evidence that certain regulatory responses may unintentionally impede insurers’ willingness to provide coverage against natural disasters.

This article examines the effect of the liability reforms on medical malpractice insurance over the 1984-91 period. This is the first study to use data by firm and by state for every firm writing medical malpractice insurance over that time period. The liability reforms increased insurance profitability (that is, decreased the loss ratios), where the main mechanism of influence was through decreasing losses. The quantile regression estimates imply that the greatest effects of liability reform are on the most unprofitable firms and that the effect is not uniform across the entire market. This pattern is consistent with the other principal finding, which is that damages caps appear to be most influential.