2006
DOI: 10.1007/s11166-006-0171-z
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The catastrophic effects of natural disasters on insurance markets

Abstract: Natural disasters often have catastrophic risks on insurance companies as well as on the insured. Using a very large dataset on homeowners' insurance coverage by state, by firm, and by year for the 1984 to 2004 period, this paper documents the positive effect on losses and loss ratios of both unexpected catastrophes as well as large events that the authors term "blockbuster catastrophes." Insurers adapt to these catastrophic risks by raising insurance rates, leading to lower loss ratios after the catastrophic … Show more

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Cited by 79 publications
(48 citation statements)
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“…In some markets, extremely slow capital movement leads to price reversals that continue over many months. For example, Froot and O'Connell (1999), Zanjani (2002), and Born and Viscusi (2006) explain how premiums for catastrophe risk insurance typically increase dramatically when insurance and re‐insurance firms suffer significant damage claims after natural disasters such as Hurricane Andrews in 1992. Premiums then drop toward “soft‐market” levels over many months (absent other shocks to the capital of insurers) because the replacement of insurance capital is delayed by institutional barriers to capital raising, including the time spent searching for suitable new investors.…”
Section: Motivating Example 3: Catastrophe Risk Premium Dynamicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In some markets, extremely slow capital movement leads to price reversals that continue over many months. For example, Froot and O'Connell (1999), Zanjani (2002), and Born and Viscusi (2006) explain how premiums for catastrophe risk insurance typically increase dramatically when insurance and re‐insurance firms suffer significant damage claims after natural disasters such as Hurricane Andrews in 1992. Premiums then drop toward “soft‐market” levels over many months (absent other shocks to the capital of insurers) because the replacement of insurance capital is delayed by institutional barriers to capital raising, including the time spent searching for suitable new investors.…”
Section: Motivating Example 3: Catastrophe Risk Premium Dynamicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This relies on the assumption that markets are imperfect and the supply of capital to insurers adjusts slowly in the short run, particularly after an industry-wide loss shock. The capacity-constraint theory argument is that underwriting cycles are the result of frictions caused by a temporary incapacity of the industry to insure all risks (Gron, 1994a, b;Winter, 1994), or the impact of a major catastrophe (Cummins, 2006;Born and Viscusi, 2006) which depletes part of the capital in the reinsurance market (Berger et al, 1992;Meier and Outreville, 2006). As insured risks are not independent, premium nonlinearity results from the dependence between losses.…”
Section: Insurance Cyclesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the impact of climate change on wind extremes has not received similar attention even though they have effects on energy sectors Barthelmie 2010, 2013), design and safety of buildings and bridges (ASCE 7-05: Minimum Design Loads for Building and Structures), insurance industry (Born and Viscusi 2006), and coastal ecosystems (Iles et al 2012). In the last decade, economic and insured losses due to extreme winds have increased unprecedentedly (Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%