Proceeding from an article by Gordon, published in 1954, the substance of an economic theory of the fisheries has emerged from the writings of a number of economists.2 The theory has emphasized the commonproperty nature of the fishery resource, generally leading to an ' over-exploitation ' that results in dissipation of the rent that the resource could yield.The literature stresses, on the supply side, the relationship of output to the amount of fishing effort-the latter, in turn, providing a link with cost. But the consequences of these and other relationships in terms of conventional supply and demand analysis-as may be traced in simple price/output graphs-do not appear to have been treated exhaustively. It is in this area that the present article attempts to make a modest contribution. The analysis that follows purports to demonstrate that the long-run supply curve of a fishery, as a matter of course, may be expected to exhibit a negative slope for higher price ranges. A few of the consequences of this phenomenon are explored.The initial model presented here considers, in isolation, a fishery based on the exploitation of a circumscribed stock of fish of one species with an unchanging matrix of natural conditions and bioligical relationships. Factor proportions and the state of fishing technology are regarded as fixed and it is assumed that there is unrestricted entry to the fishery. Supply is considered statically in terms of a long-run equilibrium in the weight of catch (per given time span). The time allowed for equilibration must be adequate for the adjustment of fishing effort to (long-run) conditions of market demand and, simultaneously, for biological adjustment of the fish stock to changes in the level of fishing effort. In other words, the supply in any instance, is one that is characterized by the sustained application of a particular level of fishing effort.
In many fisheries around the world, the failures of centralized, top-down management have produced a shift toward co-management—collaboration and sharing of decision making between government and stakeholders. This trend has led to a major debate between two very different co-management approaches—community-based fishery management and market-based individual transferable quota management. This paper examines the debate over the relative merits of these models and undertakes a socioeconomic analysis of the two approaches. The paper includes (1) an analysis of differences in the structure, philosophical nature, and underlying value systems of each, including a discussion of their treatment of property rights; (2) a socioeconomic evaluation of the impacts of each system on boat owners, fishers, crew members, other fishery participants, and coastal communities, as well as the distribution of benefits and costs among fishery participants; and (3) examination of indirect economic effects that can occur through impacts on conservation and fishery sustainability. The latter relate to (a) the conservation ethic, (b) the flexibility of management, (c) the avoidance of waste, and (d) the efficiency of enforcement. The paper emphasizes the need for a broader approach to analyzing fishery management options, one that recognizes and properly assesses the diversity of choices, and that takes into account the interaction of the fishery with broader community and regional realities.
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