“…Simple analytical models have had success in predicting the effects of many formal institutions individually. For example, analytical models correctly predicted that fishers would fish close to the boundaries of marine protected areas (MPAs) to capitalize on target species spillover (Kellner, Tetreault, Gaines, & Nisbet, ; Murawski, Wigley, Fogarty, Rago, & Mountain, ); that fishers might “high‐grade” (i.e., discard low value fish) in response to trip or catch limits that were assessed only at port (Branch et al, ; Copes, ); and that ITQs would reduce fleet capacity and increase fleet‐wide profits (Arnason, ). Fewer formal, analytical models are used to study informal institutions in fisheries, though there are game theoretic models exploring emergence of cooperation (Klein et al, ; Tilman et al, ), and many conceptual models exploring informal institutions, in fisheries and other social‐ecological systems (Hunt, Sutton, & Arlinghaus, ; Kraak, ).…”