The aim of this paper is to assess the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure and the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes (board composition, board size, CEO duality, director ownership, block-holder ownership and the existence of audit committee) on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. The measurement of disclosure is based on published data created from a checklist developed by the United Nations, which was gathered from a manual review of financial statements and websites of a sample of Egyptian companies listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Although the levels of CG disclosure are found to be minimal, however disclosure is high for items that are mandatory under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs).The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt.Moreover, the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to the socio-economic factors in Egypt. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian firms will take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG disclosure. The findings indicate that that -ceteris paribus -the extent of CG disclosure: (1) is lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by block-holder ownership;and (2)
PurposeThe UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk, and the performance‐based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects. Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated “what” risks are allocated and to “whom”, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine “how” and “why” PPP risks are diffused by their financiers.Design/methodology/approachThis study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers.FindingsThe findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects, impacting on the government's economic argument for risk transfer.Originality/valueThe expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations.
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