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We examine the relationship between institutional investor ownership and dividend payouts using a large sample of NSE-listed non-financial firms during the period 2001 to 2016. Consistent with the evidence from the US market, institutional investors, on average, have larger holdings in dividend-paying firms and are seen to prefer dividend payers over non-payers among larger firms. However, among smaller firms, institutional investors seem to prefer non-paying firms. Consistent with it, logistic regression results reveal that institutional investors do improve a firms’ propensity to pay dividends, primarily across large firms. Further, among dividend-paying firms, institutional investors, on average, are observed to have relatively lesser holdings in firms with higher payouts than those with lower payouts. In line with these observations, regression analysis also provides no evidence to support a positive relationship between total institutional ownership and payout level. However, across investor categories, we do find evidence for domestic institutional investors (DII) in improving payouts. Further, we use a dynamic panel GMM estimator to correct for endogeneity and find that the relationship is robust among large firms. Our results highlight the role of DII in improving dividend payout and provide support to models that predict a positive relationship. JEL Classification: G23, G32, G34, G35

Purpose Prior research on earnings management largely assumes that newly public firms manage earnings opportunistically around IPOs. However, only a few studies have empirically examined the real motives behind newly public firms’ earnings management. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of ownership dilution on earnings management among IPO firms. The authors chose the setting of security offerings in an emerging market, which is characterised by unique ownership structure, to examine the possible incentive of owners or pre-IPO shareholders to engage in earnings management. Design/methodology/approach The study employs accrual and real transactions measures to check the presence of earnings management among 409 IPO firms from India during the period 2000‒2018. Subsequently, using ordinary least squares regression models with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, this paper examines the relationship between earnings management and selling or dilution incentives of pre-IPO shareholders. Findings The study finds that the degree of earnings manipulation by issuer firms is positively associated with the ownership dilution at the time of IPO as well as around lockup expiration. Practical implications The findings of this study will help the investors and regulators to understand the practice of earnings management among IPO firms and how it is linked to the ownership dilution of pre-IPO shareholders. Originality/value The paper contributes to the limited stream of research that investigates the motives of earnings management among IPO firms. It empirically establishes an association between the selling incentive of pre-IPO shareholders and earnings management.

Rights equity issue is one of the most common methods for subsequent equity issue in the Indian market. In rights offer, current shareholders are given short-term warrants on a pro-rata basis with the option to either purchase the new shares or sell the warrants in the market before expiration. Rights equity issue can be a potential solution to the adverse selection problem associated with capital issue and has comparatively low direct costs. In this paper, the authors analyse the operating performance of the BSE- listed manufacturing firms following rights equity issue and their linkages with firm-specific characteristics as hypothesized in the finance theory. They have selected 392 rights equity issues during the period 1991-2000 and used a methodology robust to the mean-reverting nature of accounting income. Consistent with empirical results for seasoned equity offerings in the US market, there is a statistically significant decline in the operating performance after the rights equity issue. This decline in performance is more severe for big firms, low market-to-book value firms, and firms with lower directors' holdings. Interestingly, foreign companies and companies belonging to small business groups do not show any declining trend. The authors find that the decline in perform- ance is due to the inefficiency in utilization of assets and not due to decrease in profit margins. Further, various proxies measuring market valuation also decline during the post-issue period after a run up in the pre-issue period. The results of the study suggest that over-investment hypothesis and agency models can better explain the decline in performance compared to asymmetric information hypothesis. The results also indicate that rights equity issues are not simple de-leveraging decisions. These findings have implications for several groups of capital market participants and the authors conclude with specific guidelines for them which are as follows: The investing public and analyst who are too optimistic about the issuers should consider deteriorating performance while arriving at the valuations. Investors should be vigilant about the ‘empire building’ implications of increased investments through rights issue. Optimistic managers should reassess the investment opportunities and have con-servative plans before approaching the market. The policy makers and regulators should come out with better regulatory framework to control and penalize the opportunistic managers.

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