This article discusses how security must be understood from a human rights perspective. It is submitted that human rights lawçi.e. classic civil human rightsçin fact presupposes four different concepts of security: international security; negative individual security against the state; security as justification to limit human rights; and positive state obligation to offer security to individuals against other individuals. These concepts are explained, discussed and criticised individually and in combination. Reasons are given why several of the concepts insufficiently substantiate what security encompasses: not all concepts are mutually reinforcing; in some cases they even undermine each other. This implies that international human rights law fails to provide a comprehensive, balanced view of what security means from a human rights perspective. As a result, human rights law offers less substance and direction to the security discourse than it potentially should be able to; and, moreover, this is harmful to the capacity of human rights to protect the individual. Throughout the article suggestions are made to remedy these weaknesses.

European Union (EU) law is increasingly influencing the substantive criminal law of the member states. In this area of law – in which criminal liability and subsequent punishment are at stake – protection of fundamental rights is indispensable, as a result of which means the Charter has great potential relevance. This article examines the protection of fundamental rights by Union law in the field of substantive criminal law since the Charter has become binding and compares it to the protection offered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The article focuses on two fundamental rights that rule substantive criminal law: the principle of guilt and the ne bis in idem principle. It holds that EU law still does not provide a full foundation to both principles of criminal substantive law. Given the particular nature of EU law, the practice of the institutions in substantive criminal law, and the current case law of the European Court of Justice and the ECtHR, we argue that the current level of protection in these parts of the criminal law is insufficiently convincing. Progress needs to be made in the recognition and appreciation of the principle of guilt, while the ne bis in idem principle might be overextended.

Although the UN narcotic drugs conventions do not allow states parties to legalize cannabis cultivation and trade for recreational use, there are possibilities for states to do so anyhow while staying within the boundaries of international public law. A first option concerns positive human rights obligations, i.e. obligations that require states to take measures in order to offer the best protection of human rights. If a state convincingly argues that with cannabis regulation positive human rights obligations to protect society can be more effectively achieved than under a prohibitive approach, the priority position of human rights obligations over the drugs conventions can justify such regulation. The second option regards the modification of the drugs conventions through an inter se agreement on cannabis regulation between certain of the states parties only. The positive human rights approach and the inter se possibility can strengthen each other and are a supreme combination.

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