Abstract. Given the increasing share of the EU budget devoted to Regional Policy, several studies have tried to identify the impact of structural funds on economic growth. However, so far no consensus has been reached. We assess Regional Policy effects through a non-experimental comparison group method, the regression discontinuity design, and a novel regional dataset for the 1994-2006 period. We exploit the allocation rule of EU transfers by comparing regions with a per capita GDP level just below the eligibility threshold (75% of EU average) with those just above. Our findings show a positive impact of EU Regional Policy on economic growth. JEL classification: O18, O47, C14
In a vertically differentiated setting, we consider a two-stage game between a clean firm and a dirty producer with quality competition at the first stage and price competition at the second stage under the assumption that consumers have relative preferences for quality. The equilibrium configuration changes depending on the consumers' dispersion and the relative preferences: either both producers are active at equilibrium, or the green producer is the only firm active in the market, the brown competitor being out. We analyze how the equilibrium changes when preferences are country specific (developed vs. developing countries). Finally, we show that whatever the market configuration at equilibrium, there can be a pollution damage reduction compared to the standard case without relative preferences. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce in the literature of green consumerism the notion of (possibly country-specific) relative preferences.
We prove that a su¢cient condition for the core existence in a n-Örm vertically di §erentiated market is that the qualities of Örmsí products are equally-spaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among Örms in such markets is more easily reachable when product qualities are not distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.
tIn this paper, we analyze how strategic competition between a green firm and a browncompetitor develops when their products are differentiated along two dimensions: hedonicquality and environmental quality. The former dimension refers to the pure (intrinsic) per-formance of the good, whereas the latter dimension has a positional content: buying greengoods satisfies the consumer’s desire to be portrayed as a socially worthy citizen. We con-sider the case in which these quality dimensions are in conflict with each other so that thehigher the hedonic quality of a good, the lower the corresponding environmental quality.We characterize the equilibrium configurations and discuss the policy implications deriving from ou model
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