This article explores the spectacular prevalence, and failure, of the single most common technique for protecting personal autonomy in modern society: mandated disclosure. The article has four sections: (1) A comprehensive summary of the recurring use of mandated disclosures, in many forms and circumstances, in the areas of consumer and borrower protection, patient informed consent, contract formation, and constitutional rights; (2) A survey of the empirical literature documenting the failure of the mandated disclosure regime in informing people and in improving their decisions; (3) An account of the multitude of reasons mandated disclosures fail, focusing on the political dynamics underlying the enactments of these mandates, the incentives of disclosers to carry them out, and, most importantly, on the ability of disclosees to use them; (4) An argument that mandated disclosure not only fails to achieve its stated goal but also leads to unintended consequences that often harm the very people it intends to serve.

This article explores the potential value of insurance as a substitute for government regulation of safety. Successful regulation of behavior requires information in setting standards, licensing conduct, verifying outcomes, and assessing remedies. In some areas, the private insurance sector has technological advantages in collecting and administering the information relevant to setting standards, and could outperform the government in creating incentives for optimal behavior. The paper explores several areas in which regulation and other government-oriented forms of control are replaced by private insurance schemes. The role of the law diminishes to the administration of simple rules of absolute liability or of no liability, and affected parties turn to insurers for both risk coverage and safety instructions. The paper illustrates the existing role of regulation-through-insurance in various areas of risky activity, and then explores its potential application in additional, yet unutilized, areas: (1) consumer protection; (2) food safety; and (3) financial statements. University of Chicago and University of Michigan, respectively. Helpful comments were provided by

This chapter examines the boilerplate contracts used by auto makers to procure parts from suppliers. It identifies drafting and negotiation techniques that are used to secure advantageous terms. It also explores some prominent specific arrangements as evidence that firms with bargaining power are exploiting their position to dictate self-serving but inefficient terms. Finally, it shows how standard contractual clauses solve the problem of ex-post holdup by suppliers.

Standard form contracts in consumer transactions are usually not read by consumers. This "unreadness" of contracts creates opportunities for drafters to engage in unfair trade practices. Various doctrines of contracts and consumer protection law address this concern. One of the prominent solutions coming out of recent proposals for reform is to give individuals a more substantial opportunity to read the contract before manifesting assent. With the greater opportunity to read, more transactors will actually read the terms and assent to the boilerplate will be more "robust." This Essay argues that solutions that focus on providing consumers an opportunity to read are useless, and can potentially be harmful. Most likely, greater opportunity to read would not produce greater readership of contracts-not the type that can help people make informed decisions-and the purpose of this solution would not be achieved, and could have unintended consequences. Even if the compliance with the requirement of opportunity-to-read is fairly cheap (e.g., giving consumers access to the boilerplate in advance), making this a central feature of the legal regulation of standard form contracts makes little sense. The paper ends by proposing non-legal approaches to making the contract terms more transparent, by building on market devices such as ratings and labeling.

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afin de rendre les clauses contractuelles plus transparentes, en dØveloppant des outils tels que des Øvaluations et des Øtiquetages. Kurzfassung: Standardverträge werden normalerweise von den Verbrauchern nicht gelesen. Dieses "Nichtlesen" von Verträgen schafft für die Vertragsgestalter die Gelegenheit, sich unfairer Handelspraktiken zu bedienen. Verschiedene Theorien im Vertrags-und Verbraucherschutzrecht befasse sich mit diesem Problem. Eine der herausstechenden Lçsungen, die aus Reformvorschlägen stammt, sieht vor, dem Einzelnen eine bessere Chance einzuräumen, den Vertrag wirklich zu lesen, bevor er seine Zustimmung manifestiert. Hierdurch warden mehr Transakteure die Bedingungen tatsächlich lesen und die Zustimmung zu Standardklauseln wird somit auf eine solidere Grundlage gestellt. Dieser Beitrag begründet, dass Lçsungen, die sich darauf konzentrieren, den Verbrauchern Kenntnisnahmemçglichkeiten einzuräumen, nicht nur nutzlos, sondern potentiell schädlich sind. Mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit würde eine erhçhte Chance zur Kenntnisnahme nicht dazu führen, dass die Verbraucher auch tatsächlich diese Mçglichkeit nutzen und jedenfalls nicht dazu führen, dass Hilfestellung für eine informierte Entscheidung bereitgestellt wird. Damit würde das Ziel dieser Lçsung aber verfehlt und kçnnte ungewollte Konsequenzen haben. Selbst dann, wenn es relativ günstig ist, das Erfordernis, Kenntnisnahme zu ermçglichen, einzuhalten (indem etwa den Verbrauchern im Voraus Zugang zu den Standartklauseln gewährt wird), ist es doch wenig sinnvoll, dies zu einem zentralen Aspekt der Regulierung von Standardverträgen zu erheben. Dieser Beitrag endet damit, außergesetzliche Ansätze vorzuschlagen, mit denen die Vertragsklauseln transparenter gestaltet warden, indem man auf Marktmechanismen, etwa Rating und Labeling, setzt.

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How can a prosecutor, who has only limited resources, credibly threaten so many defendants with costly and risky trials and extract plea bargains involving harsh sentences? Had defendants refused to settle, many of them would not have been charged or would have escaped with lenient sanctions. But such collective stonewalling requires coordination among defendants, which is difficult if not impossible to attain. Moreover, the prosecutor, by strategically timing and targeting her plea offers, can create conflicts of interest among defendants, frustrating any attempt at coordination. The substantial bargaining power of the resource-constrained prosecutor is therefore the product of the collective action problem that plagues defendants. This conclusion suggests that, despite the common view to the contrary, the institution of plea bargains may not improve the well-being of defendants. Absent the plea bargain option, many defendants would not have been charged in the first place. Thus, we can no longer count on the fact that plea bargains are entered voluntarily to argue that they are desirable for all parties involved.